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- Publisher Website: 10.1287/opre.1070.0458
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Article: Truthful double auction mechanisms
Title | Truthful double auction mechanisms |
---|---|
Authors | |
Keywords | Analysis and design Games/group decisions: Bidding/auctions Information systems |
Issue Date | 2008 |
Citation | Operations Research, 2008, v. 56, n. 1, p. 102-120 How to Cite? |
Abstract | Following the multistage design approach, we propose two asymptotically efficient truthful double auction mechanisms, the BC-LP mechanism and the MBC mechanism, for an exchange market with many buyers and sellers. In this market, each buyer wants to procure a bundle of commodities and each seller supplies one unit of a commodity. Furthermore, various transaction-related costs will be incurred when a buyer trades with a seller. We prove that under both mechanisms, truthful bidding is a dominant strategy for all buyers and sellers when the buyers' bundle information and the transaction cost information are common knowledge. The BC-LP mechanism can be implemented by just solving two linear programs, whereas the MBC mechanism, has a higher complexity. The empirical study shows that the MBC mechanism, achieves higher efficiency over the BC-LP mechanism and that both outperform the KSM-TR mechanism., the only known truthful mechanism for a more restrictive exchange market. © 2008 INFORMS. |
Persistent Identifier | http://hdl.handle.net/10722/296049 |
ISSN | 2023 Impact Factor: 2.2 2023 SCImago Journal Rankings: 2.848 |
ISI Accession Number ID |
DC Field | Value | Language |
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dc.contributor.author | Chu, Leon Yang | - |
dc.contributor.author | Shen, Zuo Jun Max | - |
dc.date.accessioned | 2021-02-11T04:52:43Z | - |
dc.date.available | 2021-02-11T04:52:43Z | - |
dc.date.issued | 2008 | - |
dc.identifier.citation | Operations Research, 2008, v. 56, n. 1, p. 102-120 | - |
dc.identifier.issn | 0030-364X | - |
dc.identifier.uri | http://hdl.handle.net/10722/296049 | - |
dc.description.abstract | Following the multistage design approach, we propose two asymptotically efficient truthful double auction mechanisms, the BC-LP mechanism and the MBC mechanism, for an exchange market with many buyers and sellers. In this market, each buyer wants to procure a bundle of commodities and each seller supplies one unit of a commodity. Furthermore, various transaction-related costs will be incurred when a buyer trades with a seller. We prove that under both mechanisms, truthful bidding is a dominant strategy for all buyers and sellers when the buyers' bundle information and the transaction cost information are common knowledge. The BC-LP mechanism can be implemented by just solving two linear programs, whereas the MBC mechanism, has a higher complexity. The empirical study shows that the MBC mechanism, achieves higher efficiency over the BC-LP mechanism and that both outperform the KSM-TR mechanism., the only known truthful mechanism for a more restrictive exchange market. © 2008 INFORMS. | - |
dc.language | eng | - |
dc.relation.ispartof | Operations Research | - |
dc.subject | Analysis and design | - |
dc.subject | Games/group decisions: Bidding/auctions | - |
dc.subject | Information systems | - |
dc.title | Truthful double auction mechanisms | - |
dc.type | Article | - |
dc.description.nature | link_to_subscribed_fulltext | - |
dc.identifier.doi | 10.1287/opre.1070.0458 | - |
dc.identifier.scopus | eid_2-s2.0-41549130722 | - |
dc.identifier.volume | 56 | - |
dc.identifier.issue | 1 | - |
dc.identifier.spage | 102 | - |
dc.identifier.epage | 120 | - |
dc.identifier.eissn | 1526-5463 | - |
dc.identifier.isi | WOS:000254140700010 | - |
dc.identifier.issnl | 0030-364X | - |