File Download

There are no files associated with this item.

  Links for fulltext
     (May Require Subscription)

Article: Ranked items auctions and online advertisement

TitleRanked items auctions and online advertisement
Authors
KeywordsOptimal cutoff type
Reserve price
Ranked items auctions
Revenue maximization
Online advertisement
Issue Date2007
Citation
Production and Operations Management, 2007, v. 16, n. 4, p. 510-522 How to Cite?
AbstractWe study auctions for a set of commonly-ranked items where each buyer has unit demand. This setting has promising applications in areas such as keyword auctions in the search engine advertising industry, the sale of quality-ranked raw materials, etc. An auction mechanism suitable for this setting is the simultaneous pooled auction (SPA), where each bidder simultaneously submits a single bid and is allocated an object based on the rank of his bid among all the bids. We study how to improve the seller's expected revenue by enforcing a reserve price in an SPA. We find that the use of an appropriate reserve price may significantly increase the seller's revenue, especially when the number of items for sale is relatively large compared to the number of participating bidders. One inherent problem in the SPA is that some bidders may incur ex post losses; that is, they pay more than what they value the received objects. We propose a tailored VCG mechanism that generates the same expected revenue as the SPA does, while bidders do not incur any ex post loss. We also discuss the potential applications of this research to keyword auctions. © 2007 Production and Operations Management Society.
Persistent Identifierhttp://hdl.handle.net/10722/296044
ISSN
2023 Impact Factor: 4.8
2023 SCImago Journal Rankings: 3.035

 

DC FieldValueLanguage
dc.contributor.authorFeng, Juan-
dc.contributor.authorShen, Zuo Jun Max-
dc.contributor.authorZhan, Roger Lezhou-
dc.date.accessioned2021-02-11T04:52:43Z-
dc.date.available2021-02-11T04:52:43Z-
dc.date.issued2007-
dc.identifier.citationProduction and Operations Management, 2007, v. 16, n. 4, p. 510-522-
dc.identifier.issn1059-1478-
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10722/296044-
dc.description.abstractWe study auctions for a set of commonly-ranked items where each buyer has unit demand. This setting has promising applications in areas such as keyword auctions in the search engine advertising industry, the sale of quality-ranked raw materials, etc. An auction mechanism suitable for this setting is the simultaneous pooled auction (SPA), where each bidder simultaneously submits a single bid and is allocated an object based on the rank of his bid among all the bids. We study how to improve the seller's expected revenue by enforcing a reserve price in an SPA. We find that the use of an appropriate reserve price may significantly increase the seller's revenue, especially when the number of items for sale is relatively large compared to the number of participating bidders. One inherent problem in the SPA is that some bidders may incur ex post losses; that is, they pay more than what they value the received objects. We propose a tailored VCG mechanism that generates the same expected revenue as the SPA does, while bidders do not incur any ex post loss. We also discuss the potential applications of this research to keyword auctions. © 2007 Production and Operations Management Society.-
dc.languageeng-
dc.relation.ispartofProduction and Operations Management-
dc.subjectOptimal cutoff type-
dc.subjectReserve price-
dc.subjectRanked items auctions-
dc.subjectRevenue maximization-
dc.subjectOnline advertisement-
dc.titleRanked items auctions and online advertisement-
dc.typeArticle-
dc.description.naturelink_to_subscribed_fulltext-
dc.identifier.doi10.1111/j.1937-5956.2007.tb00276.x-
dc.identifier.scopuseid_2-s2.0-34948866833-
dc.identifier.volume16-
dc.identifier.issue4-
dc.identifier.spage510-
dc.identifier.epage522-
dc.identifier.issnl1059-1478-

Export via OAI-PMH Interface in XML Formats


OR


Export to Other Non-XML Formats