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- Publisher Website: 10.1016/j.ejor.2006.04.015
- Scopus: eid_2-s2.0-33846656532
- WOS: WOS:000244758300012
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Article: Trade reduction vs. multi-stage: A comparison of double auction design approaches
Title | Trade reduction vs. multi-stage: A comparison of double auction design approaches |
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Authors | |
Keywords | Mechanism design Strategy-proof mechanism Double auction |
Issue Date | 2007 |
Citation | European Journal of Operational Research, 2007, v. 180, n. 2, p. 677-691 How to Cite? |
Abstract | With the growth of electronic markets, designing double auction mechanisms that are applicable to emerging market structures has become an important research topic. In this paper, we investigate two truthful double auction design approaches, the Trade Reduction Approach and the Multi-Stage Design Approach, and compare their resulting mechanisms in various exchange environments. We find that comparing with the Trade Reduction Approach, the Multi-Stage Design Approach offers mechanisms applicable to more complicated exchange environments. Furthermore, for the known trade reduction mechanisms, we prove that the corresponding mechanisms under the multi-stage design approach are superior in terms of both social efficiency and individual payoffs, in each exchange environment of interest. Our computational tests show that the mechanisms under the multi-stage design approach achieve very high efficiency in various scenarios. © 2006. |
Persistent Identifier | http://hdl.handle.net/10722/296041 |
ISSN | 2023 Impact Factor: 6.0 2023 SCImago Journal Rankings: 2.321 |
ISI Accession Number ID |
DC Field | Value | Language |
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dc.contributor.author | Chu, Leon Yang | - |
dc.contributor.author | Shen, Zuo Jun Max | - |
dc.date.accessioned | 2021-02-11T04:52:42Z | - |
dc.date.available | 2021-02-11T04:52:42Z | - |
dc.date.issued | 2007 | - |
dc.identifier.citation | European Journal of Operational Research, 2007, v. 180, n. 2, p. 677-691 | - |
dc.identifier.issn | 0377-2217 | - |
dc.identifier.uri | http://hdl.handle.net/10722/296041 | - |
dc.description.abstract | With the growth of electronic markets, designing double auction mechanisms that are applicable to emerging market structures has become an important research topic. In this paper, we investigate two truthful double auction design approaches, the Trade Reduction Approach and the Multi-Stage Design Approach, and compare their resulting mechanisms in various exchange environments. We find that comparing with the Trade Reduction Approach, the Multi-Stage Design Approach offers mechanisms applicable to more complicated exchange environments. Furthermore, for the known trade reduction mechanisms, we prove that the corresponding mechanisms under the multi-stage design approach are superior in terms of both social efficiency and individual payoffs, in each exchange environment of interest. Our computational tests show that the mechanisms under the multi-stage design approach achieve very high efficiency in various scenarios. © 2006. | - |
dc.language | eng | - |
dc.relation.ispartof | European Journal of Operational Research | - |
dc.subject | Mechanism design | - |
dc.subject | Strategy-proof mechanism | - |
dc.subject | Double auction | - |
dc.title | Trade reduction vs. multi-stage: A comparison of double auction design approaches | - |
dc.type | Article | - |
dc.description.nature | link_to_subscribed_fulltext | - |
dc.identifier.doi | 10.1016/j.ejor.2006.04.015 | - |
dc.identifier.scopus | eid_2-s2.0-33846656532 | - |
dc.identifier.volume | 180 | - |
dc.identifier.issue | 2 | - |
dc.identifier.spage | 677 | - |
dc.identifier.epage | 691 | - |
dc.identifier.isi | WOS:000244758300012 | - |
dc.identifier.issnl | 0377-2217 | - |