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Article: Agent competition double-auction mechanism
Title | Agent competition double-auction mechanism |
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Authors | |
Keywords | Double auction Strategyproof mechanism Mechanism design |
Issue Date | 2006 |
Citation | Management Science, 2006, v. 52, n. 8, p. 1215-1222 How to Cite? |
Abstract | This paper proposes an agent competition double-auction mechanism to simplify decision making and promote transactions for the customer-to-customer marketplaces. Under the proposed double-auction mechanism, bidding one's true valuation (private information) is the best strategy for each individual buyer and seller even when shipping costs and sales taxes are different across various possible transactions. The proposed mechanism also achieves budget balance and asymptotic efficiency. Furthermore, these results not only hold for an environment where buyers and sellers exchange identical commodities, but also can be extended to an environment with multiple substitutable commodities. © 2006 INFORMS. |
Persistent Identifier | http://hdl.handle.net/10722/296038 |
ISSN | 2023 Impact Factor: 4.6 2023 SCImago Journal Rankings: 5.438 |
ISI Accession Number ID |
DC Field | Value | Language |
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dc.contributor.author | Chu, Leon Yang | - |
dc.contributor.author | Shen, Zuo Jun Max | - |
dc.date.accessioned | 2021-02-11T04:52:42Z | - |
dc.date.available | 2021-02-11T04:52:42Z | - |
dc.date.issued | 2006 | - |
dc.identifier.citation | Management Science, 2006, v. 52, n. 8, p. 1215-1222 | - |
dc.identifier.issn | 0025-1909 | - |
dc.identifier.uri | http://hdl.handle.net/10722/296038 | - |
dc.description.abstract | This paper proposes an agent competition double-auction mechanism to simplify decision making and promote transactions for the customer-to-customer marketplaces. Under the proposed double-auction mechanism, bidding one's true valuation (private information) is the best strategy for each individual buyer and seller even when shipping costs and sales taxes are different across various possible transactions. The proposed mechanism also achieves budget balance and asymptotic efficiency. Furthermore, these results not only hold for an environment where buyers and sellers exchange identical commodities, but also can be extended to an environment with multiple substitutable commodities. © 2006 INFORMS. | - |
dc.language | eng | - |
dc.relation.ispartof | Management Science | - |
dc.subject | Double auction | - |
dc.subject | Strategyproof mechanism | - |
dc.subject | Mechanism design | - |
dc.title | Agent competition double-auction mechanism | - |
dc.type | Article | - |
dc.description.nature | link_to_subscribed_fulltext | - |
dc.identifier.doi | 10.1287/mnsc.1060.0528 | - |
dc.identifier.scopus | eid_2-s2.0-33748313116 | - |
dc.identifier.volume | 52 | - |
dc.identifier.issue | 8 | - |
dc.identifier.spage | 1215 | - |
dc.identifier.epage | 1222 | - |
dc.identifier.eissn | 1526-5501 | - |
dc.identifier.isi | WOS:000239804300007 | - |
dc.identifier.issnl | 0025-1909 | - |