Why Compatriot Partiality Arguments Cannot Support Extensive Immigration Control

Abstract

A popular argument for immigration control appeals to the costs of immigration. Some philosophers including David Miller argue that such costs support a moral justification for immigration control because compatriots owe associative duties to one another. In this paper, I challenge this line of argument. I depict a hitherto underappreciated asymmetry between freedom of exit and entry, which relies on a comparison between a person’s freedom of exit from a state and another person’s freedom of entry to the same state. This can be contrasted with the traditional asymmetry, that one cannot enjoy the freedom of exit from one’s state if one has no freedom to enter any other states. Specifically, I argue that, if partiality to our compatriots may support restrictions to freedoms of entry of potential immigrants, it may also support restrictions to freedoms of exit of fellow compatriots. This is because emigration may incur similar types of costs to our compatriots as immigration, thus, gives rise to reasons for prioritizing the collective interests of our compatriots over potential emigrants. From this asymmetry, I further argue that we should accept freedom of entry, not abandon freedom of exit. This undermines the force of the compatriot partiality argument. [Abstract from author]