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Article: A Buck-passing Account of ‘Moral Equality'
Title | A Buck-passing Account of ‘Moral Equality' |
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Authors | |
Keywords | Moral equality Moral status Moral worth Egalitarianism Buck-passing account of value |
Issue Date | 2021 |
Publisher | Springer Verlag Dordrecht. The Journal's web site is located at http://springerlink.metapress.com/openurl.asp?genre=journal&issn=1356-4765 |
Citation | Res Publica, 2021, v. 27, p. 25-40 How to Cite? |
Abstract | The belief that all human beings are ‘moral equals’ is widespread within the canon of Western liberal philosophy. However, it is unclear precisely what ‘moral equality’ or its associate terms mean, what grounds our ‘moral equality’ and what the implications of being ‘moral equals’ are. In this paper, I distinguish between three ways of understanding ‘moral equality’: the ‘buck-passing’, ‘explanatory’ and ‘reverse-explanatory’ accounts. The buck-passing account of moral equality is in parallel with Scanlon’s buck-passing account of value. It holds that ‘moral equality’ is not a metaphysically fundamental concept and simply amounts to having other properties shared equally by all human beings that constitute the reasons for why we ought to treat all human beings equally in certain respects. The explanatory account understands the concept of ‘moral equality’ as metaphysically fundamental and explanatory of why human beings who are the same in certain respects have the same entitlement to x. The reverse-explanatory account also sees ‘moral equality’ as metaphysically fundamental but holds that the explanatory relationship goes the other way round: moral equality is explained by how we ought to act. I argue that the buck-passing account is a more accurate way of understanding moral equality. |
Persistent Identifier | http://hdl.handle.net/10722/290578 |
ISSN | 2023 Impact Factor: 0.9 2023 SCImago Journal Rankings: 0.380 |
ISI Accession Number ID |
DC Field | Value | Language |
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dc.contributor.author | YIM, ELM | - |
dc.date.accessioned | 2020-11-02T05:44:14Z | - |
dc.date.available | 2020-11-02T05:44:14Z | - |
dc.date.issued | 2021 | - |
dc.identifier.citation | Res Publica, 2021, v. 27, p. 25-40 | - |
dc.identifier.issn | 1356-4765 | - |
dc.identifier.uri | http://hdl.handle.net/10722/290578 | - |
dc.description.abstract | The belief that all human beings are ‘moral equals’ is widespread within the canon of Western liberal philosophy. However, it is unclear precisely what ‘moral equality’ or its associate terms mean, what grounds our ‘moral equality’ and what the implications of being ‘moral equals’ are. In this paper, I distinguish between three ways of understanding ‘moral equality’: the ‘buck-passing’, ‘explanatory’ and ‘reverse-explanatory’ accounts. The buck-passing account of moral equality is in parallel with Scanlon’s buck-passing account of value. It holds that ‘moral equality’ is not a metaphysically fundamental concept and simply amounts to having other properties shared equally by all human beings that constitute the reasons for why we ought to treat all human beings equally in certain respects. The explanatory account understands the concept of ‘moral equality’ as metaphysically fundamental and explanatory of why human beings who are the same in certain respects have the same entitlement to x. The reverse-explanatory account also sees ‘moral equality’ as metaphysically fundamental but holds that the explanatory relationship goes the other way round: moral equality is explained by how we ought to act. I argue that the buck-passing account is a more accurate way of understanding moral equality. | - |
dc.language | eng | - |
dc.publisher | Springer Verlag Dordrecht. The Journal's web site is located at http://springerlink.metapress.com/openurl.asp?genre=journal&issn=1356-4765 | - |
dc.relation.ispartof | Res Publica | - |
dc.rights | This is a post-peer-review, pre-copyedit version of an article published in [insert journal title]. The final authenticated version is available online at: https://doi.org/[insert DOI] | - |
dc.subject | Moral equality | - |
dc.subject | Moral status | - |
dc.subject | Moral worth | - |
dc.subject | Egalitarianism | - |
dc.subject | Buck-passing account of value | - |
dc.title | A Buck-passing Account of ‘Moral Equality' | - |
dc.type | Article | - |
dc.identifier.email | YIM, ELM: loklam95@connect.hku.hk | - |
dc.description.nature | link_to_subscribed_fulltext | - |
dc.identifier.doi | 10.1007/s11158-020-09458-0 | - |
dc.identifier.scopus | eid_2-s2.0-85083210095 | - |
dc.identifier.hkuros | 317619 | - |
dc.identifier.volume | 27 | - |
dc.identifier.spage | 25 | - |
dc.identifier.epage | 40 | - |
dc.identifier.isi | WOS:000522706300002 | - |
dc.publisher.place | Netherlands | - |
dc.identifier.issnl | 1356-4765 | - |