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Article: Reputation Concerns in Risky Experimentation

TitleReputation Concerns in Risky Experimentation
Authors
Issue Date2021
PublisherOxford University Press. The Journal's web site is located at https://academic.oup.com/jeea
Citation
Journal of the European Economic Association, 2021, v. 19 n. 4, p. 1981-2021 How to Cite?
AbstractHigh-ability agents are more likely to achieve early success in risky experimentation, but learn faster that their project is not promising. These counteracting effects give rise to a signaling model with double-crossing property. This property tends to induce homogenization of quitting times between types, which in turn leads to some pooling in equilibrium. Low-ability agents may hold out to continue their project for the prospect of pooling with the high type, despite having a negative instantaneous net payoff. A war-of-attrition mechanism causes low-ability agents to quit only gradually over time, and to stop quitting for a period immediately before all agents exit.
Persistent Identifierhttp://hdl.handle.net/10722/290490
ISSN
2023 Impact Factor: 3.9
2023 SCImago Journal Rankings: 6.658
ISI Accession Number ID

 

DC FieldValueLanguage
dc.contributor.authorChen, CH-
dc.contributor.authorIshida, J-
dc.contributor.authorSuen, W-
dc.date.accessioned2020-11-02T05:42:58Z-
dc.date.available2020-11-02T05:42:58Z-
dc.date.issued2021-
dc.identifier.citationJournal of the European Economic Association, 2021, v. 19 n. 4, p. 1981-2021-
dc.identifier.issn1542-4766-
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10722/290490-
dc.description.abstractHigh-ability agents are more likely to achieve early success in risky experimentation, but learn faster that their project is not promising. These counteracting effects give rise to a signaling model with double-crossing property. This property tends to induce homogenization of quitting times between types, which in turn leads to some pooling in equilibrium. Low-ability agents may hold out to continue their project for the prospect of pooling with the high type, despite having a negative instantaneous net payoff. A war-of-attrition mechanism causes low-ability agents to quit only gradually over time, and to stop quitting for a period immediately before all agents exit.-
dc.languageeng-
dc.publisherOxford University Press. The Journal's web site is located at https://academic.oup.com/jeea-
dc.relation.ispartofJournal of the European Economic Association-
dc.rightsThis is a pre-copy-editing, author-produced PDF of an article accepted for publication in Journal of the European Economic Association following peer review. The definitive publisher-authenticated version Journal of the European Economic Association, 2021, v. 19 n. 4, p. 1981-2021 is available online at: https://academic.oup.com/jeea/article-abstract/19/4/1981/5920619?redirectedFrom=fulltext-
dc.titleReputation Concerns in Risky Experimentation-
dc.typeArticle-
dc.identifier.emailSuen, W: hrneswc@hku.hk-
dc.identifier.authoritySuen, W=rp00066-
dc.description.naturepostprint-
dc.identifier.doi10.1093/jeea/jvaa046-
dc.identifier.hkuros317660-
dc.identifier.volume19-
dc.identifier.issue4-
dc.identifier.spage1981-
dc.identifier.epage2021-
dc.identifier.isiWOS:000739652800001-
dc.publisher.placeUnited Kingdom-
dc.identifier.issnl1542-4766-

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