X-Phi Without Intuitions?

Abstract

One central purpose of experimental philosophy (hereafter, x-phi) is to criticize the alleged reliance on intuitions in contemporary philosophy. In the book Philosophy without Intuitions, the author argues that philosophers don’t rely on intuitions. If those arguments are good, experimental philosophy has been engaged in an attack on a Straw man. The goal of the current chapter is to bolster the criticism of x-phi: experimental philosophy doesn’t (need to) target intuitions; its criticism of philosophical practice stands even if it isn’t the case that philosophers rely on intuitions. The aim is to convince the reader that experimental philosophers underestimate the difficulties involved in the revision this reply gestures at. They talk as if what is required is nothing but a slight terminological revision, but it is not. In this chapter, eight options for how to reformulate the x-phi project are considered. It is argued that they all fail.