File Download
  Links for fulltext
     (May Require Subscription)
Supplementary

Book Chapter: Conceptual Engineering: The Master Argument

TitleConceptual Engineering: The Master Argument
Authors
Keywordsconceptual engineering
metasemantics
ameliorative projects
verbal disputes
externalism
Issue Date2020
PublisherOxford University Press
Citation
Conceptual Engineering: The Master Argument. In Burgess, A ; Cappelen, H & Plunkett, D (Eds.), Conceptual Engineering and Conceptual Ethics, p. 132-151. Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press, 2020 How to Cite?
AbstractThis chapter develops and defends the Master Argument for Conceptual Engineering: (1) If W is a word that has a meaning M, then there are many similar meanings, M1,M2,...,Mn, W could have. (2) We have no good reason to think that the meaning that W ended up with is the best meaning W could have: there will typically be indefinitely many alternative meanings that would be better meanings for W. (3) When we speak, think, and theorize it’s important to make sure our words have as good meanings as possible. (4) As a corollary: when doing philosophy, we should try to find good meanings for core philosophical terms and they will typically not be the meanings those words as a matter of fact have. (5) So no matter what topic a philosopher is concerned with, she should assess and ameliorate the meanings of central terms. I respond to seven objections to this argument.
DescriptionChapter 7
Persistent Identifierhttp://hdl.handle.net/10722/290367
ISBN

 

DC FieldValueLanguage
dc.contributor.authorBurgess, A-
dc.contributor.authorCappelen, HW-
dc.contributor.authorPlunkett, D-
dc.date.accessioned2020-10-27T03:34:39Z-
dc.date.available2020-10-27T03:34:39Z-
dc.date.issued2020-
dc.identifier.citationConceptual Engineering: The Master Argument. In Burgess, A ; Cappelen, H & Plunkett, D (Eds.), Conceptual Engineering and Conceptual Ethics, p. 132-151. Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press, 2020-
dc.identifier.isbn9780198801856-
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10722/290367-
dc.descriptionChapter 7-
dc.description.abstractThis chapter develops and defends the Master Argument for Conceptual Engineering: (1) If W is a word that has a meaning M, then there are many similar meanings, M1,M2,...,Mn, W could have. (2) We have no good reason to think that the meaning that W ended up with is the best meaning W could have: there will typically be indefinitely many alternative meanings that would be better meanings for W. (3) When we speak, think, and theorize it’s important to make sure our words have as good meanings as possible. (4) As a corollary: when doing philosophy, we should try to find good meanings for core philosophical terms and they will typically not be the meanings those words as a matter of fact have. (5) So no matter what topic a philosopher is concerned with, she should assess and ameliorate the meanings of central terms. I respond to seven objections to this argument.-
dc.languageeng-
dc.publisherOxford University Press-
dc.relation.ispartofConceptual Engineering and Conceptual Ethics-
dc.rightsThis work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivatives 4.0 International License.-
dc.subjectconceptual engineering-
dc.subjectmetasemantics-
dc.subjectameliorative projects-
dc.subjectverbal disputes-
dc.subjectexternalism-
dc.titleConceptual Engineering: The Master Argument-
dc.typeBook_Chapter-
dc.identifier.emailCappelen, HW: hwcapp@hku.hk-
dc.identifier.authorityCappelen, HW=rp02716-
dc.description.naturepublished_or_final_version-
dc.identifier.doi10.1093/oso/9780198801856.003.0007-
dc.identifier.hkuros326959-
dc.identifier.spage132-
dc.identifier.epage151-
dc.publisher.placeOxford, UK-

Export via OAI-PMH Interface in XML Formats


OR


Export to Other Non-XML Formats