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- Publisher Website: 10.1080/0020174X.2017.1262018
- Scopus: eid_2-s2.0-85003875981
- WOS: WOS:000396782500007
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Article: Empathy and transformative experience without the first person point of view (a reply to L. A. Paul)
| Title | Empathy and transformative experience without the first person point of view (a reply to L. A. Paul) |
|---|---|
| Authors | |
| Keywords | De se Tranformative experience First person perspective Empathy |
| Issue Date | 2017 |
| Citation | Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy, 2017, v. 60, n. 3, p. 315-336 How to Cite? |
| Abstract | © 2016 Informa UK Limited, trading as Taylor & Francis Group. In her very interesting ‘First-personal modes of presentation and the problem of empathy’ (2017, 315–336), L. A. Paul argues that the phenomenon of empathy gives us reason to care about the first person point of view: that as theorists we can only understand, and as humans only evince, empathy by appealing to that point of view. We are skeptics about the importance of the first person point of view, although not about empathy. The goal of this paper is to see if we can account for empathy without the ideology of the first person. We conclude that we can. |
| Persistent Identifier | http://hdl.handle.net/10722/286934 |
| ISSN | 2023 Impact Factor: 1.0 2023 SCImago Journal Rankings: 0.769 |
| ISI Accession Number ID |
| DC Field | Value | Language |
|---|---|---|
| dc.contributor.author | Cappelen, Herman | - |
| dc.contributor.author | Dever, Josh | - |
| dc.date.accessioned | 2020-09-07T11:46:03Z | - |
| dc.date.available | 2020-09-07T11:46:03Z | - |
| dc.date.issued | 2017 | - |
| dc.identifier.citation | Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy, 2017, v. 60, n. 3, p. 315-336 | - |
| dc.identifier.issn | 0020-174X | - |
| dc.identifier.uri | http://hdl.handle.net/10722/286934 | - |
| dc.description.abstract | © 2016 Informa UK Limited, trading as Taylor & Francis Group. In her very interesting ‘First-personal modes of presentation and the problem of empathy’ (2017, 315–336), L. A. Paul argues that the phenomenon of empathy gives us reason to care about the first person point of view: that as theorists we can only understand, and as humans only evince, empathy by appealing to that point of view. We are skeptics about the importance of the first person point of view, although not about empathy. The goal of this paper is to see if we can account for empathy without the ideology of the first person. We conclude that we can. | - |
| dc.language | eng | - |
| dc.relation.ispartof | Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy | - |
| dc.subject | De se | - |
| dc.subject | Tranformative experience | - |
| dc.subject | First person perspective | - |
| dc.subject | Empathy | - |
| dc.title | Empathy and transformative experience without the first person point of view (a reply to L. A. Paul) | - |
| dc.type | Article | - |
| dc.description.nature | link_to_subscribed_fulltext | - |
| dc.identifier.doi | 10.1080/0020174X.2017.1262018 | - |
| dc.identifier.scopus | eid_2-s2.0-85003875981 | - |
| dc.identifier.volume | 60 | - |
| dc.identifier.issue | 3 | - |
| dc.identifier.spage | 315 | - |
| dc.identifier.epage | 336 | - |
| dc.identifier.eissn | 1502-3923 | - |
| dc.identifier.isi | WOS:000396782500007 | - |
| dc.identifier.issnl | 0020-174X | - |