File Download

There are no files associated with this item.

Supplementary

Conference Paper: What’s My Style? Supply-Side Determinants of Debt Covenant Inclusion

TitleWhat’s My Style? Supply-Side Determinants of Debt Covenant Inclusion
Authors
Issue Date2021
Citation
The 43rd European Accounting Association (EAA) Annual Congress, Virtual Conference, 26-28 May 2021 How to Cite?
AbstractWe examine the supply-side determinants of debt covenants included in loan agreements. Controlling for borrower characteristics, we find evidence that the covenants that lead arranger banks include in new contracts persist into future contracts for at least three years. We document that this covenant style effect is smaller when borrowers have recently violated a debt covenant or when the loan issue amount is large, and it is larger when the costs of contracting are highest and when a borrower provides collateral. We also find that the covenant style effect decreases following changes in a bank’s CEO or CFO. Overall, our evidence is consistent with lenders’ covenant preferences being related to their expertise in negotiating, monitoring, and enforcing covenants.
DescriptionParallel Session FAPS.07: Financial Analysis
Persistent Identifierhttp://hdl.handle.net/10722/286518

 

DC FieldValueLanguage
dc.contributor.authorMa, ZM-
dc.contributor.authorStice, DE-
dc.contributor.authorWilliams, C-
dc.date.accessioned2020-08-31T07:04:58Z-
dc.date.available2020-08-31T07:04:58Z-
dc.date.issued2021-
dc.identifier.citationThe 43rd European Accounting Association (EAA) Annual Congress, Virtual Conference, 26-28 May 2021-
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10722/286518-
dc.descriptionParallel Session FAPS.07: Financial Analysis-
dc.description.abstractWe examine the supply-side determinants of debt covenants included in loan agreements. Controlling for borrower characteristics, we find evidence that the covenants that lead arranger banks include in new contracts persist into future contracts for at least three years. We document that this covenant style effect is smaller when borrowers have recently violated a debt covenant or when the loan issue amount is large, and it is larger when the costs of contracting are highest and when a borrower provides collateral. We also find that the covenant style effect decreases following changes in a bank’s CEO or CFO. Overall, our evidence is consistent with lenders’ covenant preferences being related to their expertise in negotiating, monitoring, and enforcing covenants.-
dc.languageeng-
dc.relation.ispartofThe 43rd European Accounting Association (EAA) Annual Conference-
dc.titleWhat’s My Style? Supply-Side Determinants of Debt Covenant Inclusion-
dc.typeConference_Paper-
dc.identifier.emailStice, DE: dstice@hku.hk-
dc.identifier.authorityStice, DE=rp02572-
dc.identifier.hkuros313719-

Export via OAI-PMH Interface in XML Formats


OR


Export to Other Non-XML Formats