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Conference Paper: Bridging the gap between theory and practice in quantum cryptography
Title | Bridging the gap between theory and practice in quantum cryptography |
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Authors | |
Keywords | quantum key distribution source aws quantum communication side-channel attacks quantum cryptography loss-tolerant quantum key distribution measurement-device-independent quantum key distribution |
Issue Date | 2015 |
Citation | Proceedings of SPIE - The International Society for Optical Engineering, 2015, v. 9648 How to Cite? |
Abstract | © 2015 SPIE. Quantum key distribution (QKD) needs to close the big gap between theory and practice to be a suitable technology for achieving information-theoretic secure communications. Indeed, recent studies on side-channel attacks have exposed the vulnerabilities of QKD implementations against an eavesdropper who may try to attack both the source and the measurement device. Here, we review two potential approaches that, combined, could bring this goal closer: measurement-device-independent QKD and the loss-tolerant QKD protocol. The former removes all possible side-channels from the measurement apparatus and guarantees a high performance over long distances. The latter appears as a robust solution against typical source flaws and it offers similar key rates as those of standard QKD systems. Most importantly, the feasibility of both solutions has already been demonstrated in several lab and field-test experiments. |
Persistent Identifier | http://hdl.handle.net/10722/285766 |
ISSN | 2023 SCImago Journal Rankings: 0.152 |
ISI Accession Number ID |
DC Field | Value | Language |
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dc.contributor.author | Curty, Marcos | - |
dc.contributor.author | Tamaki, Kiyoshi | - |
dc.contributor.author | Xu, Feihu | - |
dc.contributor.author | Mizutani, Akihiro | - |
dc.contributor.author | Lim, Charles C.W. | - |
dc.contributor.author | Qi, Bing | - |
dc.contributor.author | Lo, Hoi Kwong | - |
dc.date.accessioned | 2020-08-18T04:56:35Z | - |
dc.date.available | 2020-08-18T04:56:35Z | - |
dc.date.issued | 2015 | - |
dc.identifier.citation | Proceedings of SPIE - The International Society for Optical Engineering, 2015, v. 9648 | - |
dc.identifier.issn | 0277-786X | - |
dc.identifier.uri | http://hdl.handle.net/10722/285766 | - |
dc.description.abstract | © 2015 SPIE. Quantum key distribution (QKD) needs to close the big gap between theory and practice to be a suitable technology for achieving information-theoretic secure communications. Indeed, recent studies on side-channel attacks have exposed the vulnerabilities of QKD implementations against an eavesdropper who may try to attack both the source and the measurement device. Here, we review two potential approaches that, combined, could bring this goal closer: measurement-device-independent QKD and the loss-tolerant QKD protocol. The former removes all possible side-channels from the measurement apparatus and guarantees a high performance over long distances. The latter appears as a robust solution against typical source flaws and it offers similar key rates as those of standard QKD systems. Most importantly, the feasibility of both solutions has already been demonstrated in several lab and field-test experiments. | - |
dc.language | eng | - |
dc.relation.ispartof | Proceedings of SPIE - The International Society for Optical Engineering | - |
dc.subject | quantum key distribution | - |
dc.subject | source aws | - |
dc.subject | quantum communication | - |
dc.subject | side-channel attacks | - |
dc.subject | quantum cryptography | - |
dc.subject | loss-tolerant quantum key distribution | - |
dc.subject | measurement-device-independent quantum key distribution | - |
dc.title | Bridging the gap between theory and practice in quantum cryptography | - |
dc.type | Conference_Paper | - |
dc.description.nature | link_to_subscribed_fulltext | - |
dc.identifier.doi | 10.1117/12.2199415 | - |
dc.identifier.scopus | eid_2-s2.0-84961786671 | - |
dc.identifier.volume | 9648 | - |
dc.identifier.spage | null | - |
dc.identifier.epage | null | - |
dc.identifier.eissn | 1996-756X | - |
dc.identifier.isi | WOS:000368009700024 | - |
dc.identifier.issnl | 0277-786X | - |