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Article: Measurement-device-independent quantum key distribution

TitleMeasurement-device-independent quantum key distribution
Authors
Issue Date2012
Citation
Physical Review Letters, 2012, v. 108, n. 13, article no. 130503 How to Cite?
AbstractHow to remove detector side channel attacks has been a notoriously hard problem in quantum cryptography. Here, we propose a simple solution to this problem-measurement-device-independent quantum key distribution (QKD). It not only removes all detector side channels, but also doubles the secure distance with conventional lasers. Our proposal can be implemented with standard optical components with low detection efficiency and highly lossy channels. In contrast to the previous solution of full device independent QKD, the realization of our idea does not require detectors of near unity detection efficiency in combination with a qubit amplifier (based on teleportation) or a quantum nondemolition measurement of the number of photons in a pulse. Furthermore, its key generation rate is many orders of magnitude higher than that based on full device independent QKD. The results show that long-distance quantum cryptography over say 200km will remain secure even with seriously flawed detectors. © 2012 American Physical Society.
Persistent Identifierhttp://hdl.handle.net/10722/285688
ISSN
2022 Impact Factor: 8.6
2020 SCImago Journal Rankings: 3.688
ISI Accession Number ID

 

DC FieldValueLanguage
dc.contributor.authorLo, Hoi Kwong-
dc.contributor.authorCurty, Marcos-
dc.contributor.authorQi, Bing-
dc.date.accessioned2020-08-18T04:56:23Z-
dc.date.available2020-08-18T04:56:23Z-
dc.date.issued2012-
dc.identifier.citationPhysical Review Letters, 2012, v. 108, n. 13, article no. 130503-
dc.identifier.issn0031-9007-
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10722/285688-
dc.description.abstractHow to remove detector side channel attacks has been a notoriously hard problem in quantum cryptography. Here, we propose a simple solution to this problem-measurement-device-independent quantum key distribution (QKD). It not only removes all detector side channels, but also doubles the secure distance with conventional lasers. Our proposal can be implemented with standard optical components with low detection efficiency and highly lossy channels. In contrast to the previous solution of full device independent QKD, the realization of our idea does not require detectors of near unity detection efficiency in combination with a qubit amplifier (based on teleportation) or a quantum nondemolition measurement of the number of photons in a pulse. Furthermore, its key generation rate is many orders of magnitude higher than that based on full device independent QKD. The results show that long-distance quantum cryptography over say 200km will remain secure even with seriously flawed detectors. © 2012 American Physical Society.-
dc.languageeng-
dc.relation.ispartofPhysical Review Letters-
dc.titleMeasurement-device-independent quantum key distribution-
dc.typeArticle-
dc.description.naturelink_to_subscribed_fulltext-
dc.identifier.doi10.1103/PhysRevLett.108.130503-
dc.identifier.scopuseid_2-s2.0-84859361763-
dc.identifier.volume108-
dc.identifier.issue13-
dc.identifier.spagearticle no. 130503-
dc.identifier.epagearticle no. 130503-
dc.identifier.eissn1079-7114-
dc.identifier.isiWOS:000302173000005-
dc.identifier.issnl0031-9007-

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