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Conference Paper: Quantum hacking: Attacking practical quantum key distribution systems

TitleQuantum hacking: Attacking practical quantum key distribution systems
Authors
KeywordsSingle photon detector
Quantum key distribution
Phase modulation
Efficiency
Issue Date2007
Citation
Proceedings of SPIE - The International Society for Optical Engineering, 2007, v. 6710 How to Cite?
AbstractQuantum key distribution (QKD) can, in principle, provide unconditional security based on the fundamental laws of physics. Unfortunately, a practical QKD system may contain overlooked imperfections and violate some of the assumptions in a security proof. Here, we report two types of eavesdropping attacks against a practical QKD system. The first one is "time-shift" attack, which is applicable to QKD systems with gated single photon detectors (SPDs). In this attack, the eavesdropper, Eve, exploits the time mismatch between the open windows of the two SPDs. She can acquire a significant amount of information on the final key by simply shifting the quantum signals forwards or backwards in time domain. Our experimental results in [9] with a commercial QKD system demonstrate that, under this attack, the original QKD system is breakable. This is the first experimental demonstration of a feasible attack against a commercial QKD system. This is a surprising result. The second one is "phase-remapping" attack [10]. Here, Eve exploits the fact that a practical phase modulator has a finite response time. In principle, Eve could change the encoded phase value by timeshifting the signal pulse relative to the reference pulse.
Persistent Identifierhttp://hdl.handle.net/10722/285620
ISSN
2023 SCImago Journal Rankings: 0.152

 

DC FieldValueLanguage
dc.contributor.authorQi, Bing-
dc.contributor.authorFung, Chi Hang Fred-
dc.contributor.authorZhao, Yi-
dc.contributor.authorMa, Xiongfeng-
dc.contributor.authorTamaki, Kiyoshi-
dc.contributor.authorChen, Christine-
dc.contributor.authorLo, Hoi Kwong-
dc.date.accessioned2020-08-18T04:56:13Z-
dc.date.available2020-08-18T04:56:13Z-
dc.date.issued2007-
dc.identifier.citationProceedings of SPIE - The International Society for Optical Engineering, 2007, v. 6710-
dc.identifier.issn0277-786X-
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10722/285620-
dc.description.abstractQuantum key distribution (QKD) can, in principle, provide unconditional security based on the fundamental laws of physics. Unfortunately, a practical QKD system may contain overlooked imperfections and violate some of the assumptions in a security proof. Here, we report two types of eavesdropping attacks against a practical QKD system. The first one is "time-shift" attack, which is applicable to QKD systems with gated single photon detectors (SPDs). In this attack, the eavesdropper, Eve, exploits the time mismatch between the open windows of the two SPDs. She can acquire a significant amount of information on the final key by simply shifting the quantum signals forwards or backwards in time domain. Our experimental results in [9] with a commercial QKD system demonstrate that, under this attack, the original QKD system is breakable. This is the first experimental demonstration of a feasible attack against a commercial QKD system. This is a surprising result. The second one is "phase-remapping" attack [10]. Here, Eve exploits the fact that a practical phase modulator has a finite response time. In principle, Eve could change the encoded phase value by timeshifting the signal pulse relative to the reference pulse.-
dc.languageeng-
dc.relation.ispartofProceedings of SPIE - The International Society for Optical Engineering-
dc.subjectSingle photon detector-
dc.subjectQuantum key distribution-
dc.subjectPhase modulation-
dc.subjectEfficiency-
dc.titleQuantum hacking: Attacking practical quantum key distribution systems-
dc.typeConference_Paper-
dc.description.naturelink_to_subscribed_fulltext-
dc.identifier.doi10.1117/12.730776-
dc.identifier.scopuseid_2-s2.0-42149154899-
dc.identifier.volume6710-
dc.identifier.spagenull-
dc.identifier.epagenull-
dc.identifier.issnl0277-786X-

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