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Article: Busting the 'Princelings': The Campaign Against Corruption in China’s Primary Land Market

TitleBusting the 'Princelings': The Campaign Against Corruption in China’s Primary Land Market
Authors
Issue Date2018
PublisherOxford University Press. The Journal's web site is located at http://qje.oxfordjournals.org/
Citation
The Quarterly Journal of Economics, 2018, v. 134 n. 1, p. 185-226 How to Cite?
AbstractUsing data on over a million land transactions during 2004–2016 where local governments are the sole seller, we find that firms linked to members of China's supreme political elites—the Politburo—obtained a price discount ranging from 55.4% to 59.9% compared with those without the same connections. These firms also purchased slightly more land. In return, the provincial party secretaries who provided the discount to these “princeling” firms are 23.4% more likely to be promoted to positions of national leadership. To curb corruption, President Xi Jinping stepped up investigations and strengthened personnel control at the province level. Using a spatially matched sample (e.g., within a 500-meter radius), we find a reduction in corruption of between 42.6% and 31.5% in the provinces either targeted by the central inspection teams or whose party secretary was replaced by one appointed by Xi. Accordingly, this crackdown on corruption has also significantly reduced the promotional prospects of those local officials who rely on supplying a discount to get ahead.
Persistent Identifierhttp://hdl.handle.net/10722/284772
ISSN
2023 Impact Factor: 11.1
2023 SCImago Journal Rankings: 30.448
ISI Accession Number ID

 

DC FieldValueLanguage
dc.contributor.authorChen, T-
dc.contributor.authorKung, JKS-
dc.date.accessioned2020-08-07T09:02:25Z-
dc.date.available2020-08-07T09:02:25Z-
dc.date.issued2018-
dc.identifier.citationThe Quarterly Journal of Economics, 2018, v. 134 n. 1, p. 185-226-
dc.identifier.issn0033-5533-
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10722/284772-
dc.description.abstractUsing data on over a million land transactions during 2004–2016 where local governments are the sole seller, we find that firms linked to members of China's supreme political elites—the Politburo—obtained a price discount ranging from 55.4% to 59.9% compared with those without the same connections. These firms also purchased slightly more land. In return, the provincial party secretaries who provided the discount to these “princeling” firms are 23.4% more likely to be promoted to positions of national leadership. To curb corruption, President Xi Jinping stepped up investigations and strengthened personnel control at the province level. Using a spatially matched sample (e.g., within a 500-meter radius), we find a reduction in corruption of between 42.6% and 31.5% in the provinces either targeted by the central inspection teams or whose party secretary was replaced by one appointed by Xi. Accordingly, this crackdown on corruption has also significantly reduced the promotional prospects of those local officials who rely on supplying a discount to get ahead.-
dc.languageeng-
dc.publisherOxford University Press. The Journal's web site is located at http://qje.oxfordjournals.org/-
dc.relation.ispartofThe Quarterly Journal of Economics-
dc.rightsPre-print: Journal Title] ©: [year] [owner as specified on the article] Published by Oxford University Press [on behalf of xxxxxx]. All rights reserved. Pre-print (Once an article is published, preprint notice should be amended to): This is an electronic version of an article published in [include the complete citation information for the final version of the Article as published in the print edition of the Journal.] Post-print: This is a pre-copy-editing, author-produced PDF of an article accepted for publication in [insert journal title] following peer review. The definitive publisher-authenticated version [insert complete citation information here] is available online at: xxxxxxx [insert URL that the author will receive upon publication here].-
dc.titleBusting the 'Princelings': The Campaign Against Corruption in China’s Primary Land Market-
dc.typeArticle-
dc.identifier.emailKung, JKS: jkskung@hku.hk-
dc.identifier.authorityKung, JKS=rp02402-
dc.description.naturelink_to_subscribed_fulltext-
dc.identifier.doi10.1093/qje/qjy027-
dc.identifier.scopuseid_2-s2.0-85066278895-
dc.identifier.hkuros312348-
dc.identifier.volume134-
dc.identifier.issue1-
dc.identifier.spage185-
dc.identifier.epage226-
dc.identifier.isiWOS:000489161300004-
dc.publisher.placeUnited States-
dc.identifier.issnl0033-5533-

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