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Article: There is Something Wrong with Raw Perception, After All: Vyāsatīrtha’s Refutation of Nirvikalpaka-Pratyakṣa
Title | There is Something Wrong with Raw Perception, After All: Vyāsatīrtha’s Refutation of Nirvikalpaka-Pratyakṣa |
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Authors | |
Keywords | Direct realism Dvaita Vedānta Navya Nyāya Non-conceptual perception |
Issue Date | 2020 |
Publisher | Springer Verlag Dordrecht. The Journal's web site is located at http://springerlink.metapress.com/openurl.asp?genre=journal&issn=0022-1791 |
Citation | Journal of Indian Philosophy, 2020, v. 48 n. 2, p. 255-314 How to Cite? |
Abstract | This paper analyzes the incisive counter-arguments against Gaṅgeśa’s defense of non-conceptual perception (nirvikalpakapratyakṣa) offered by the Dvaita Vedānta scholar Vyāsatīrtha (sixteenth century) in his Destructive Dance of Dialectic (Tarkatāṇḍava). The details of Vyāsatīrtha’s arguments have gone largely unnoticed by subsequent Navya Nyāya thinkers, as well as by contemporary scholars engaged in a debate over the role of non-conceptual perception in Nyāya epistemology. Vyāsatīrtha thoroughly undercuts the inductive evidence supporting Gaṅgeśa’s main inferential proof of non-conceptual perception, and shows that Gaṅgeśa has no basis for thinking that non-conceptual perception has any necessary causal role in generating concept-laden perceptual awareness. He further raises a number of internal inconsistencies and undesirable consequences for Gaṅgeśa’s claim that non-conceptual states are introspectively invisible. His own causal theory of perception is more parsimonious than the Nyāya account, and is equally compatible with direct realism. I conclude by noting several striking parallels between Vyāsatīrtha’s views and the conceptualism of John McDowell, while also suggesting that Vyāsatīrtha own conceptualism is not unduly constrained by some of McDowell’s limiting assumptions about concepts and perceptual contents. |
Persistent Identifier | http://hdl.handle.net/10722/282549 |
ISSN | 2023 Impact Factor: 0.4 2023 SCImago Journal Rankings: 0.270 |
ISI Accession Number ID |
DC Field | Value | Language |
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dc.contributor.author | Chaturvedi, A | - |
dc.date.accessioned | 2020-05-15T05:29:33Z | - |
dc.date.available | 2020-05-15T05:29:33Z | - |
dc.date.issued | 2020 | - |
dc.identifier.citation | Journal of Indian Philosophy, 2020, v. 48 n. 2, p. 255-314 | - |
dc.identifier.issn | 0022-1791 | - |
dc.identifier.uri | http://hdl.handle.net/10722/282549 | - |
dc.description.abstract | This paper analyzes the incisive counter-arguments against Gaṅgeśa’s defense of non-conceptual perception (nirvikalpakapratyakṣa) offered by the Dvaita Vedānta scholar Vyāsatīrtha (sixteenth century) in his Destructive Dance of Dialectic (Tarkatāṇḍava). The details of Vyāsatīrtha’s arguments have gone largely unnoticed by subsequent Navya Nyāya thinkers, as well as by contemporary scholars engaged in a debate over the role of non-conceptual perception in Nyāya epistemology. Vyāsatīrtha thoroughly undercuts the inductive evidence supporting Gaṅgeśa’s main inferential proof of non-conceptual perception, and shows that Gaṅgeśa has no basis for thinking that non-conceptual perception has any necessary causal role in generating concept-laden perceptual awareness. He further raises a number of internal inconsistencies and undesirable consequences for Gaṅgeśa’s claim that non-conceptual states are introspectively invisible. His own causal theory of perception is more parsimonious than the Nyāya account, and is equally compatible with direct realism. I conclude by noting several striking parallels between Vyāsatīrtha’s views and the conceptualism of John McDowell, while also suggesting that Vyāsatīrtha own conceptualism is not unduly constrained by some of McDowell’s limiting assumptions about concepts and perceptual contents. | - |
dc.language | eng | - |
dc.publisher | Springer Verlag Dordrecht. The Journal's web site is located at http://springerlink.metapress.com/openurl.asp?genre=journal&issn=0022-1791 | - |
dc.relation.ispartof | Journal of Indian Philosophy | - |
dc.rights | This is a post-peer-review, pre-copyedit version of an article published in Journal of Indian Philosophy. The final authenticated version is available online at: https://doi.org/10.1007/s10781-020-09420-7 | - |
dc.subject | Direct realism | - |
dc.subject | Dvaita Vedānta | - |
dc.subject | Navya Nyāya | - |
dc.subject | Non-conceptual perception | - |
dc.title | There is Something Wrong with Raw Perception, After All: Vyāsatīrtha’s Refutation of Nirvikalpaka-Pratyakṣa | - |
dc.type | Article | - |
dc.identifier.email | Chaturvedi, A: amitc@hku.hk | - |
dc.identifier.authority | Chaturvedi, A=rp02427 | - |
dc.description.nature | postprint | - |
dc.identifier.doi | 10.1007/s10781-020-09420-7 | - |
dc.identifier.scopus | eid_2-s2.0-85078483284 | - |
dc.identifier.hkuros | 309912 | - |
dc.identifier.volume | 48 | - |
dc.identifier.issue | 2 | - |
dc.identifier.spage | 255 | - |
dc.identifier.epage | 314 | - |
dc.identifier.isi | WOS:000515657100001 | - |
dc.publisher.place | Netherlands | - |
dc.identifier.issnl | 0022-1791 | - |