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- Publisher Website: 10.1016/j.geb.2019.11.004
- Scopus: eid_2-s2.0-85076852332
- WOS: WOS:000515443700021
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Article: Multilateral interactions improve cooperation under random fluctuations
Title | Multilateral interactions improve cooperation under random fluctuations |
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Authors | |
Keywords | Repeated games Relational contracts Multimarket contact Favor exchange |
Issue Date | 2020 |
Publisher | Academic Press. The Journal's web site is located at http://www.elsevier.com/locate/geb |
Citation | Games and Economic Behavior, 2020, v. 119, p. 358-382 How to Cite? |
Abstract | In an environment subject to random fluctuations, when does an increase in the breadth of activities in which individuals interact together help foster collaboration on each activity? We show that when players, on average, prefer to stick to a cooperative agreement rather than reneging by taking their privately optimal action, then such an agreement can be approximated as equilibrium play in a sufficiently broad relationship. This is in contrast to existing results showing that a cooperative agreement can be sustained only if players prefer to adhere to it in every state of the world. We consider applications to favor exchange, multimarket contact, and relational contracts. |
Description | Link to Free access |
Persistent Identifier | http://hdl.handle.net/10722/281196 |
ISSN | 2023 Impact Factor: 1.0 2023 SCImago Journal Rankings: 1.522 |
ISI Accession Number ID |
DC Field | Value | Language |
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dc.contributor.author | Li, J | - |
dc.contributor.author | Powell, M | - |
dc.date.accessioned | 2020-03-09T09:51:26Z | - |
dc.date.available | 2020-03-09T09:51:26Z | - |
dc.date.issued | 2020 | - |
dc.identifier.citation | Games and Economic Behavior, 2020, v. 119, p. 358-382 | - |
dc.identifier.issn | 0899-8256 | - |
dc.identifier.uri | http://hdl.handle.net/10722/281196 | - |
dc.description | Link to Free access | - |
dc.description.abstract | In an environment subject to random fluctuations, when does an increase in the breadth of activities in which individuals interact together help foster collaboration on each activity? We show that when players, on average, prefer to stick to a cooperative agreement rather than reneging by taking their privately optimal action, then such an agreement can be approximated as equilibrium play in a sufficiently broad relationship. This is in contrast to existing results showing that a cooperative agreement can be sustained only if players prefer to adhere to it in every state of the world. We consider applications to favor exchange, multimarket contact, and relational contracts. | - |
dc.language | eng | - |
dc.publisher | Academic Press. The Journal's web site is located at http://www.elsevier.com/locate/geb | - |
dc.relation.ispartof | Games and Economic Behavior | - |
dc.subject | Repeated games | - |
dc.subject | Relational contracts | - |
dc.subject | Multimarket contact | - |
dc.subject | Favor exchange | - |
dc.title | Multilateral interactions improve cooperation under random fluctuations | - |
dc.type | Article | - |
dc.identifier.email | Li, J: jli1@hku.hk | - |
dc.identifier.authority | Li, J=rp02406 | - |
dc.description.nature | link_to_subscribed_fulltext | - |
dc.identifier.doi | 10.1016/j.geb.2019.11.004 | - |
dc.identifier.scopus | eid_2-s2.0-85076852332 | - |
dc.identifier.hkuros | 309337 | - |
dc.identifier.volume | 119 | - |
dc.identifier.spage | 358 | - |
dc.identifier.epage | 382 | - |
dc.identifier.isi | WOS:000515443700021 | - |
dc.publisher.place | United States | - |
dc.identifier.issnl | 0899-8256 | - |