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Conference Paper: Strong Leakage and Tamper-Resilient PKE from Refined Hash Proof System

TitleStrong Leakage and Tamper-Resilient PKE from Refined Hash Proof System
Authors
KeywordsHash proof system
Leakage attack
Public key encryption
Chosen-ciphertext security
Tampering attack
Issue Date2019
Citation
Lecture Notes in Computer Science (including subseries Lecture Notes in Artificial Intelligence and Lecture Notes in Bioinformatics), 2019, v. 11464 LNCS, p. 486-506 How to Cite?
Abstract© Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2019. We revisit the problem of constructing public key encryption (PKE) secure against both key-leakage and tampering attacks. First, we present an enhanced security against both kinds of attacks, namely strong leakage and tamper-resilient chosen-ciphertext (sLTR-CCA) security, which imposes only minimal restrictions on the adversary’s queries and thus captures the capability of the adversary in a more reasonable way. Then, we propose a generic paradigm achieving this security on the basis of a refined hash proof system (HPS) called public-key-malleable HPS. The paradigm can not only tolerate a large amount of bounded key-leakage, but also resist an arbitrary polynomial of restricted tampering attacks, even depending on the challenge phase. Moreover, the paradigm with slight adaptations can also be proven sLTR-CCA secure with respect to subexponentially hard auxiliary-input leakage. In addition, we instantiate our paradigm under certain standard number-theoretic assumptions, and thus, to our best knowledge, obtain the first efficient PKE schemes possessing the strong bounded/auxiliary-input leakage and tamper-resilient chosen-ciphertext security in the standard model.
Persistent Identifierhttp://hdl.handle.net/10722/280497
ISSN
2023 SCImago Journal Rankings: 0.606
ISI Accession Number ID

 

DC FieldValueLanguage
dc.contributor.authorSun, Shi Feng-
dc.contributor.authorGu, Dawu-
dc.contributor.authorAu, Man Ho-
dc.contributor.authorHan, Shuai-
dc.contributor.authorYu, Yu-
dc.contributor.authorLiu, Joseph-
dc.date.accessioned2020-02-17T14:34:10Z-
dc.date.available2020-02-17T14:34:10Z-
dc.date.issued2019-
dc.identifier.citationLecture Notes in Computer Science (including subseries Lecture Notes in Artificial Intelligence and Lecture Notes in Bioinformatics), 2019, v. 11464 LNCS, p. 486-506-
dc.identifier.issn0302-9743-
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10722/280497-
dc.description.abstract© Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2019. We revisit the problem of constructing public key encryption (PKE) secure against both key-leakage and tampering attacks. First, we present an enhanced security against both kinds of attacks, namely strong leakage and tamper-resilient chosen-ciphertext (sLTR-CCA) security, which imposes only minimal restrictions on the adversary’s queries and thus captures the capability of the adversary in a more reasonable way. Then, we propose a generic paradigm achieving this security on the basis of a refined hash proof system (HPS) called public-key-malleable HPS. The paradigm can not only tolerate a large amount of bounded key-leakage, but also resist an arbitrary polynomial of restricted tampering attacks, even depending on the challenge phase. Moreover, the paradigm with slight adaptations can also be proven sLTR-CCA secure with respect to subexponentially hard auxiliary-input leakage. In addition, we instantiate our paradigm under certain standard number-theoretic assumptions, and thus, to our best knowledge, obtain the first efficient PKE schemes possessing the strong bounded/auxiliary-input leakage and tamper-resilient chosen-ciphertext security in the standard model.-
dc.languageeng-
dc.relation.ispartofLecture Notes in Computer Science (including subseries Lecture Notes in Artificial Intelligence and Lecture Notes in Bioinformatics)-
dc.subjectHash proof system-
dc.subjectLeakage attack-
dc.subjectPublic key encryption-
dc.subjectChosen-ciphertext security-
dc.subjectTampering attack-
dc.titleStrong Leakage and Tamper-Resilient PKE from Refined Hash Proof System-
dc.typeConference_Paper-
dc.description.naturelink_to_subscribed_fulltext-
dc.identifier.doi10.1007/978-3-030-21568-2_24-
dc.identifier.scopuseid_2-s2.0-85067242402-
dc.identifier.volume11464 LNCS-
dc.identifier.spage486-
dc.identifier.epage506-
dc.identifier.eissn1611-3349-
dc.identifier.isiWOS:000501602600024-
dc.identifier.issnl0302-9743-

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