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Article: Hello, is anybody there? Corporate accessibility for outside shareholders as a signal of agency problems

TitleHello, is anybody there? Corporate accessibility for outside shareholders as a signal of agency problems
Authors
KeywordsCorporate accessibility
Agency problems
Direct communications
Signaling
Issue Date2019
PublisherSpringer New York LLC. The Journal's web site is located at http://springerlink.metapress.com/openurl.asp?genre=journal&issn=1380-6653
Citation
Review of Accounting Studies, 2019, v. 24, p. 1317-1358 How to Cite?
AbstractIn this paper, we develop a corporate accessibility measure for publicly listed firms in China based on their responses to outside market participants’ attempts to communicate with them (via telephone, e-mail, and online discussion forum), and examine whether the provision of corporate accessibility signals the incidence of agency problems. We find robust evidence that non-accessible firms are associated with more agency problems, manifested in greater tunneling of corporate resources through inter-corporate loans and related-party transactions, greater consumption of managerial slack, more earnings management, and a higher probability of committing corporate fraud. We also find that non-accessible firms are more likely to conduct value-destroying acquisitions than accessible firms. Furthermore, we find that non-accessible firms underperform accessible firms in both firm valuation and operating performance. Overall, our results suggest that a firm’s decision to provide corporate accessibility is a value-relevant signal for informing investors of the severity of agency problems in publicly listed firms.
Persistent Identifierhttp://hdl.handle.net/10722/279020
ISSN
2023 Impact Factor: 4.8
2023 SCImago Journal Rankings: 5.481
ISI Accession Number ID

 

DC FieldValueLanguage
dc.contributor.authorFirth, M-
dc.contributor.authorLin, C-
dc.contributor.authorWong, SML-
dc.contributor.authorZhao, X-
dc.date.accessioned2019-10-21T02:18:09Z-
dc.date.available2019-10-21T02:18:09Z-
dc.date.issued2019-
dc.identifier.citationReview of Accounting Studies, 2019, v. 24, p. 1317-1358-
dc.identifier.issn1380-6653-
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10722/279020-
dc.description.abstractIn this paper, we develop a corporate accessibility measure for publicly listed firms in China based on their responses to outside market participants’ attempts to communicate with them (via telephone, e-mail, and online discussion forum), and examine whether the provision of corporate accessibility signals the incidence of agency problems. We find robust evidence that non-accessible firms are associated with more agency problems, manifested in greater tunneling of corporate resources through inter-corporate loans and related-party transactions, greater consumption of managerial slack, more earnings management, and a higher probability of committing corporate fraud. We also find that non-accessible firms are more likely to conduct value-destroying acquisitions than accessible firms. Furthermore, we find that non-accessible firms underperform accessible firms in both firm valuation and operating performance. Overall, our results suggest that a firm’s decision to provide corporate accessibility is a value-relevant signal for informing investors of the severity of agency problems in publicly listed firms.-
dc.languageeng-
dc.publisherSpringer New York LLC. The Journal's web site is located at http://springerlink.metapress.com/openurl.asp?genre=journal&issn=1380-6653-
dc.relation.ispartofReview of Accounting Studies-
dc.rightsThis is a post-peer-review, pre-copyedit version of an article published in [insert journal title]. The final authenticated version is available online at: http://dx.doi.org/[insert DOI]-
dc.subjectCorporate accessibility-
dc.subjectAgency problems-
dc.subjectDirect communications-
dc.subjectSignaling-
dc.titleHello, is anybody there? Corporate accessibility for outside shareholders as a signal of agency problems-
dc.typeArticle-
dc.identifier.emailLin, C: chenlin1@hku.hk-
dc.identifier.authorityLin, C=rp01808-
dc.description.naturelink_to_subscribed_fulltext-
dc.identifier.doi10.1007/s11142-019-09501-3-
dc.identifier.scopuseid_2-s2.0-85070967609-
dc.identifier.hkuros308095-
dc.identifier.volume24-
dc.identifier.spage1317-
dc.identifier.epage1358-
dc.identifier.isiWOS:000501074100006-
dc.publisher.placeUnited States-
dc.identifier.issnl1380-6653-

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