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- Publisher Website: 10.1017/S0022109019000693
- Scopus: eid_2-s2.0-85072038316
- WOS: WOS:000590302100003
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Article: Managerial Entrenchment and Information Production
Title | Managerial Entrenchment and Information Production |
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Authors | |
Keywords | Disclosure Voluntary disclosure Corporate disclosure |
Issue Date | 2020 |
Publisher | Cambridge University Press. The Journal's web site is located at http://journals.cambridge.org/action/displayJournal?jid=jfq |
Citation | Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis, 2020, v. 55 n. 8, p. 2500-2529 How to Cite? |
Abstract | In this paper, we evaluate the effect of managerial entrenchment on corporate information production using the voting outcomes of shareholder-initiated proposals intended to mitigate managerial entrenchment. We focus on the proposals that are passed or rejected by a small margin of votes, which generate plausibly exogenous variations in managerial entrenchment. We find that a reduction in managerial entrenchment enhances corporate information production. The effects are stronger for firms with greater information asymmetries and severer agency frictions. Overall, the evidence is consistent with the view that reducing managerial entrenchment enhances corporate disclosure by aligning the incentives of managers and shareholders. |
Persistent Identifier | http://hdl.handle.net/10722/279017 |
ISSN | 2023 Impact Factor: 3.7 2023 SCImago Journal Rankings: 3.980 |
ISI Accession Number ID |
DC Field | Value | Language |
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dc.contributor.author | Lin, C | - |
dc.contributor.author | Wei, L | - |
dc.contributor.author | Xie, W | - |
dc.date.accessioned | 2019-10-21T02:18:06Z | - |
dc.date.available | 2019-10-21T02:18:06Z | - |
dc.date.issued | 2020 | - |
dc.identifier.citation | Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis, 2020, v. 55 n. 8, p. 2500-2529 | - |
dc.identifier.issn | 0022-1090 | - |
dc.identifier.uri | http://hdl.handle.net/10722/279017 | - |
dc.description.abstract | In this paper, we evaluate the effect of managerial entrenchment on corporate information production using the voting outcomes of shareholder-initiated proposals intended to mitigate managerial entrenchment. We focus on the proposals that are passed or rejected by a small margin of votes, which generate plausibly exogenous variations in managerial entrenchment. We find that a reduction in managerial entrenchment enhances corporate information production. The effects are stronger for firms with greater information asymmetries and severer agency frictions. Overall, the evidence is consistent with the view that reducing managerial entrenchment enhances corporate disclosure by aligning the incentives of managers and shareholders. | - |
dc.language | eng | - |
dc.publisher | Cambridge University Press. The Journal's web site is located at http://journals.cambridge.org/action/displayJournal?jid=jfq | - |
dc.relation.ispartof | Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis | - |
dc.rights | Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis. Copyright © Cambridge University Press. | - |
dc.rights | This article has been published in a revised form in [Journal] [http://doi.org/XXX]. This version is free to view and download for private research and study only. Not for re-distribution, re-sale or use in derivative works. © copyright holder. | - |
dc.subject | Disclosure | - |
dc.subject | Voluntary disclosure | - |
dc.subject | Corporate disclosure | - |
dc.title | Managerial Entrenchment and Information Production | - |
dc.type | Article | - |
dc.identifier.email | Lin, C: chenlin1@hku.hk | - |
dc.identifier.authority | Lin, C=rp01808 | - |
dc.description.nature | link_to_subscribed_fulltext | - |
dc.identifier.doi | 10.1017/S0022109019000693 | - |
dc.identifier.scopus | eid_2-s2.0-85072038316 | - |
dc.identifier.hkuros | 308092 | - |
dc.identifier.volume | 55 | - |
dc.identifier.issue | 8 | - |
dc.identifier.spage | 2500 | - |
dc.identifier.epage | 2529 | - |
dc.identifier.eissn | 1756-6916 | - |
dc.identifier.isi | WOS:000590302100003 | - |
dc.publisher.place | United Kingdom | - |
dc.identifier.issnl | 0022-1090 | - |