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- Publisher Website: 10.1016/j.jacceco.2018.12.002
- Scopus: eid_2-s2.0-85058801920
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Article: Does short-selling threat discipline managers in mergers and acquisitions decisions?
Title | Does short-selling threat discipline managers in mergers and acquisitions decisions? |
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Authors | |
Keywords | Mergers and acquisitions Short-selling threat External corporate governance Lending supply Announcement returns |
Issue Date | 2019 |
Publisher | Elsevier BV. The Journal's web site is located at http://www.elsevier.com/locate/jae |
Citation | Journal of Accounting and Economics, 2019, v. 68 n. 1, p. article no. 101223 How to Cite? |
Abstract | We explore the governance effect of short-selling threat on mergers and acquisitions (M&A). We use equity lending supply (LS) to proxy for the threat, as short sellers incentives to scrutinize a firm depend on the availability of borrowing shares. Our results show that acquirers with higher LS have higher announcement returns. The effect is stronger when acquirers are more likely to be targets of subsequent hostile takeovers and when their managers wealth is more linked to stock prices. We conduct four sets of tests to mitigate endogeneity concerns. Finally, the governance effect exists only for deals prone to agency problems. |
Persistent Identifier | http://hdl.handle.net/10722/279004 |
ISSN | 2023 Impact Factor: 5.4 2023 SCImago Journal Rankings: 8.337 |
ISI Accession Number ID |
DC Field | Value | Language |
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dc.contributor.author | Chang, EC | - |
dc.contributor.author | Lin, TC | - |
dc.contributor.author | Ma, X | - |
dc.date.accessioned | 2019-10-21T02:17:51Z | - |
dc.date.available | 2019-10-21T02:17:51Z | - |
dc.date.issued | 2019 | - |
dc.identifier.citation | Journal of Accounting and Economics, 2019, v. 68 n. 1, p. article no. 101223 | - |
dc.identifier.issn | 0165-4101 | - |
dc.identifier.uri | http://hdl.handle.net/10722/279004 | - |
dc.description.abstract | We explore the governance effect of short-selling threat on mergers and acquisitions (M&A). We use equity lending supply (LS) to proxy for the threat, as short sellers incentives to scrutinize a firm depend on the availability of borrowing shares. Our results show that acquirers with higher LS have higher announcement returns. The effect is stronger when acquirers are more likely to be targets of subsequent hostile takeovers and when their managers wealth is more linked to stock prices. We conduct four sets of tests to mitigate endogeneity concerns. Finally, the governance effect exists only for deals prone to agency problems. | - |
dc.language | eng | - |
dc.publisher | Elsevier BV. The Journal's web site is located at http://www.elsevier.com/locate/jae | - |
dc.relation.ispartof | Journal of Accounting and Economics | - |
dc.subject | Mergers and acquisitions | - |
dc.subject | Short-selling threat | - |
dc.subject | External corporate governance | - |
dc.subject | Lending supply | - |
dc.subject | Announcement returns | - |
dc.title | Does short-selling threat discipline managers in mergers and acquisitions decisions? | - |
dc.type | Article | - |
dc.identifier.email | Chang, EC: ecchang@hku.hk | - |
dc.identifier.email | Lin, TC: chunlin@hku.hk | - |
dc.identifier.authority | Chang, EC=rp01050 | - |
dc.identifier.authority | Lin, TC=rp01077 | - |
dc.description.nature | link_to_subscribed_fulltext | - |
dc.identifier.doi | 10.1016/j.jacceco.2018.12.002 | - |
dc.identifier.scopus | eid_2-s2.0-85058801920 | - |
dc.identifier.hkuros | 308025 | - |
dc.identifier.volume | 68 | - |
dc.identifier.issue | 1 | - |
dc.identifier.spage | article no. 101223 | - |
dc.identifier.epage | article no. 101223 | - |
dc.identifier.isi | WOS:000503094700009 | - |
dc.publisher.place | Netherlands | - |
dc.identifier.issnl | 0165-4101 | - |