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Conference Paper: Convenience vs. Pleasance: Matching on Horizontal and Vertical Dimensions and the Information Design on Peer-to-Peer Platforms

TitleConvenience vs. Pleasance: Matching on Horizontal and Vertical Dimensions and the Information Design on Peer-to-Peer Platforms
Authors
Issue Date2019
PublisherINFORMS Society for Marketing Science (ISMS).
Citation
41st Annual ISMS Marketing Science Conference, Rome, Italy, 20-22 June 2019 How to Cite?
AbstractWe consider a two-sided decentralized matching scenario on a peer-to-peer (P2P) platform. Each of the agents on one side, called “senders”, sends an offer to one of the agents on the other side, called “receivers”. A match is successful if a receiver accepts an offer. Both senders and receivers are differentiated in two dimensions, a vertical attribute like quality and a horizontal attribute like location. The utility from a match increases with vertical quality and decreases with horizontal distance for both senders and receivers. We compare equilibrium strategies and welfare under different information display schemes. In addition, under the full information scheme, we also compare the decentralized and centralized matching in terms of user welfare.
DescriptionSD11: Game Theory 3 Contributed Session
Persistent Identifierhttp://hdl.handle.net/10722/273190

 

DC FieldValueLanguage
dc.contributor.authorLei, Y-
dc.contributor.authorDu, J-
dc.date.accessioned2019-08-06T09:24:13Z-
dc.date.available2019-08-06T09:24:13Z-
dc.date.issued2019-
dc.identifier.citation41st Annual ISMS Marketing Science Conference, Rome, Italy, 20-22 June 2019-
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10722/273190-
dc.descriptionSD11: Game Theory 3 Contributed Session-
dc.description.abstractWe consider a two-sided decentralized matching scenario on a peer-to-peer (P2P) platform. Each of the agents on one side, called “senders”, sends an offer to one of the agents on the other side, called “receivers”. A match is successful if a receiver accepts an offer. Both senders and receivers are differentiated in two dimensions, a vertical attribute like quality and a horizontal attribute like location. The utility from a match increases with vertical quality and decreases with horizontal distance for both senders and receivers. We compare equilibrium strategies and welfare under different information display schemes. In addition, under the full information scheme, we also compare the decentralized and centralized matching in terms of user welfare.-
dc.languageeng-
dc.publisherINFORMS Society for Marketing Science (ISMS).-
dc.relation.ispartofISMS Marketing Science Conference 2019-
dc.titleConvenience vs. Pleasance: Matching on Horizontal and Vertical Dimensions and the Information Design on Peer-to-Peer Platforms-
dc.typeConference_Paper-
dc.identifier.emailDu, J: jzdu@hku.hk-
dc.identifier.authorityDu, J=rp02423-
dc.identifier.hkuros300417-
dc.publisher.placeItaly-

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