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- Publisher Website: 10.1007/s11747-018-0582-9
- Scopus: eid_2-s2.0-85046478768
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Article: Institutions and Opportunism in Buyer–Supplier Exchanges: The Moderated Mediating Effects of Contractual and Relational Governance
Title | Institutions and Opportunism in Buyer–Supplier Exchanges: The Moderated Mediating Effects of Contractual and Relational Governance |
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Authors | |
Keywords | Institutional theory Legal effectiveness Networking expenditure Government support Opportunism |
Issue Date | 2018 |
Publisher | Springer New York LLC. The Journal's web site is located at http://www.springer.com/business+%26+management/journal/11747 |
Citation | Journal of the Academy of Marketing Science, 2018, v. 46 n. 6, p. 1014-1031 How to Cite? |
Abstract | The marketing channel literature has paid limited attention to institutional environments that constrain buyer–supplier exchanges, though such institutions are fundamental determinants of transaction costs, and thus of the occurrence of opportunism in the buyer–supplier dyads. Drawing on transaction cost economics and institutional theory, this study uncovers the critical influence of formal and informal institutions (i.e., legal effectiveness and networking expenditure) on the use of governance in deterring opportunism, as well as the moderating role of government support on the efficacy of governance mechanism. The findings from a buyer–supplier dyadic survey and 2 secondary datasets reveal that legal effectiveness mitigates opportunism through increased use of both contractual and relational governance; in contrast, networking expenditure reduces opportunism through relational governance, yet increases opportunism via lowering contractual governance. In addition, contractual governance is more efficient in constraining opportunism when government support is high, whereas relational governance deters opportunism more when government support is low. These findings offer important implications for academic research and managerial practice. |
Persistent Identifier | http://hdl.handle.net/10722/272785 |
ISSN | 2023 Impact Factor: 9.5 2023 SCImago Journal Rankings: 7.194 |
ISI Accession Number ID |
DC Field | Value | Language |
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dc.contributor.author | Sheng, S | - |
dc.contributor.author | Zhou, KZ | - |
dc.contributor.author | Li, JJ | - |
dc.contributor.author | Guo, Z | - |
dc.date.accessioned | 2019-08-06T09:16:31Z | - |
dc.date.available | 2019-08-06T09:16:31Z | - |
dc.date.issued | 2018 | - |
dc.identifier.citation | Journal of the Academy of Marketing Science, 2018, v. 46 n. 6, p. 1014-1031 | - |
dc.identifier.issn | 0092-0703 | - |
dc.identifier.uri | http://hdl.handle.net/10722/272785 | - |
dc.description.abstract | The marketing channel literature has paid limited attention to institutional environments that constrain buyer–supplier exchanges, though such institutions are fundamental determinants of transaction costs, and thus of the occurrence of opportunism in the buyer–supplier dyads. Drawing on transaction cost economics and institutional theory, this study uncovers the critical influence of formal and informal institutions (i.e., legal effectiveness and networking expenditure) on the use of governance in deterring opportunism, as well as the moderating role of government support on the efficacy of governance mechanism. The findings from a buyer–supplier dyadic survey and 2 secondary datasets reveal that legal effectiveness mitigates opportunism through increased use of both contractual and relational governance; in contrast, networking expenditure reduces opportunism through relational governance, yet increases opportunism via lowering contractual governance. In addition, contractual governance is more efficient in constraining opportunism when government support is high, whereas relational governance deters opportunism more when government support is low. These findings offer important implications for academic research and managerial practice. | - |
dc.language | eng | - |
dc.publisher | Springer New York LLC. The Journal's web site is located at http://www.springer.com/business+%26+management/journal/11747 | - |
dc.relation.ispartof | Journal of the Academy of Marketing Science | - |
dc.rights | This is a post-peer-review, pre-copyedit version of an article published in [insert journal title]. The final authenticated version is available online at: http://dx.doi.org/[insert DOI] | - |
dc.subject | Institutional theory | - |
dc.subject | Legal effectiveness | - |
dc.subject | Networking expenditure | - |
dc.subject | Government support Opportunism | - |
dc.title | Institutions and Opportunism in Buyer–Supplier Exchanges: The Moderated Mediating Effects of Contractual and Relational Governance | - |
dc.type | Article | - |
dc.identifier.email | Zhou, KZ: kevinzhou@business.hku.hk | - |
dc.identifier.authority | Zhou, KZ=rp01127 | - |
dc.description.nature | link_to_subscribed_fulltext | - |
dc.identifier.doi | 10.1007/s11747-018-0582-9 | - |
dc.identifier.scopus | eid_2-s2.0-85046478768 | - |
dc.identifier.hkuros | 300061 | - |
dc.identifier.volume | 46 | - |
dc.identifier.issue | 6 | - |
dc.identifier.spage | 1014 | - |
dc.identifier.epage | 1031 | - |
dc.identifier.isi | WOS:000446505100004 | - |
dc.publisher.place | United States | - |
dc.identifier.issnl | 0092-0703 | - |