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Article: Vertical integration and disruptive cross-market R&D

TitleVertical integration and disruptive cross-market R&D
Authors
Keywordsinnovation
replacement effect
structural change
vertical integration
Issue Date2020
PublisherWiley-Blackwell Publishing, Inc. The Journal's web site is located at http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/journal/10.1111/(ISSN)1530-9134
Citation
Journal of Economics & Management Strategy, 2020, v. 29 n. 1, p. 51-73 How to Cite?
AbstractWe study how vertical market structure affects the incentives of suppliers and customers to develop a new input that will enable the innovator to replace the incumbent supplier. In a vertical setting with an incumbent monopoly upstream supplier and two downstream firms, we show that vertical integration reduces the R&D incentives of the integrated parties, but increases that of the nonintegrated downstream rival. Strategic vertical integration may occur whereby the upstream incumbent integrates with a downstream firm to discourage or even preempt downstream disruptive R&D. Depending on the R&D costs, vertical integration may lower the social rate of innovation. © 2019 Wiley Periodicals, Inc.
Persistent Identifierhttp://hdl.handle.net/10722/272781
ISSN
2023 Impact Factor: 1.2
2023 SCImago Journal Rankings: 0.961
ISI Accession Number ID

 

DC FieldValueLanguage
dc.contributor.authorLin, P-
dc.contributor.authorZhang, T-
dc.contributor.authorZhou, W-
dc.date.accessioned2019-08-06T09:16:27Z-
dc.date.available2019-08-06T09:16:27Z-
dc.date.issued2020-
dc.identifier.citationJournal of Economics & Management Strategy, 2020, v. 29 n. 1, p. 51-73-
dc.identifier.issn1058-6407-
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10722/272781-
dc.description.abstractWe study how vertical market structure affects the incentives of suppliers and customers to develop a new input that will enable the innovator to replace the incumbent supplier. In a vertical setting with an incumbent monopoly upstream supplier and two downstream firms, we show that vertical integration reduces the R&D incentives of the integrated parties, but increases that of the nonintegrated downstream rival. Strategic vertical integration may occur whereby the upstream incumbent integrates with a downstream firm to discourage or even preempt downstream disruptive R&D. Depending on the R&D costs, vertical integration may lower the social rate of innovation. © 2019 Wiley Periodicals, Inc.-
dc.languageeng-
dc.publisherWiley-Blackwell Publishing, Inc. The Journal's web site is located at http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/journal/10.1111/(ISSN)1530-9134-
dc.relation.ispartofJournal of Economics & Management Strategy-
dc.rightsThis is the peer reviewed version of the following article: Journal of Economics & Management Strategy, 2020, v. 29 n. 1, p. 51-73, which has been published in final form at https://doi.org/10.1111/jems.12328. This article may be used for non-commercial purposes in accordance with Wiley Terms and Conditions for Use of Self-Archived Versions.-
dc.subjectinnovation-
dc.subjectreplacement effect-
dc.subjectstructural change-
dc.subjectvertical integration-
dc.titleVertical integration and disruptive cross-market R&D-
dc.typeArticle-
dc.identifier.emailZhou, W: wzhou@hku.hk-
dc.identifier.authorityZhou, W=rp01128-
dc.description.naturepostprint-
dc.identifier.doi10.1111/jems.12328-
dc.identifier.scopuseid_2-s2.0-85070273499-
dc.identifier.hkuros300043-
dc.identifier.volume29-
dc.identifier.issue1-
dc.identifier.spage51-
dc.identifier.epage73-
dc.identifier.isiWOS:000481347400001-
dc.publisher.placeUnited States-
dc.identifier.issnl1058-6407-

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