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- Publisher Website: 10.1093/restud/rdw035
- Scopus: eid_2-s2.0-85014197829
- WOS: WOS:000397127400008
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Article: Information revelation in relational contracts
Title | Information revelation in relational contracts |
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Authors | |
Keywords | Relational contract Information |
Issue Date | 2017 |
Citation | Review of Economic Studies, 2017, v. 84, n. 1, p. 277-299 How to Cite? |
Abstract | © The Author 2016. We explore subjective performance reviews in long-term employment relationships. We show that firms benefit from separating the task of evaluating the worker from the task of paying him. The separation allows the reviewer to better manage the review process, and can, therefore, reward the worker for his good performance with not only a good review contemporaneously, but also a promise of better review in the future. Such reviews spread the reward for the worker's good performance across time and lower the firm's maximal temptation to renege on the reward. The manner in which information is managed exhibits patterns consistent with a number of well-documented biases in performance reviews. |
Persistent Identifier | http://hdl.handle.net/10722/269758 |
ISSN | 2023 Impact Factor: 5.9 2023 SCImago Journal Rankings: 13.609 |
ISI Accession Number ID |
DC Field | Value | Language |
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dc.contributor.author | Fong, Yuk Fai | - |
dc.contributor.author | Li, Jin | - |
dc.date.accessioned | 2019-04-30T01:49:30Z | - |
dc.date.available | 2019-04-30T01:49:30Z | - |
dc.date.issued | 2017 | - |
dc.identifier.citation | Review of Economic Studies, 2017, v. 84, n. 1, p. 277-299 | - |
dc.identifier.issn | 0034-6527 | - |
dc.identifier.uri | http://hdl.handle.net/10722/269758 | - |
dc.description.abstract | © The Author 2016. We explore subjective performance reviews in long-term employment relationships. We show that firms benefit from separating the task of evaluating the worker from the task of paying him. The separation allows the reviewer to better manage the review process, and can, therefore, reward the worker for his good performance with not only a good review contemporaneously, but also a promise of better review in the future. Such reviews spread the reward for the worker's good performance across time and lower the firm's maximal temptation to renege on the reward. The manner in which information is managed exhibits patterns consistent with a number of well-documented biases in performance reviews. | - |
dc.language | eng | - |
dc.relation.ispartof | Review of Economic Studies | - |
dc.subject | Relational contract | - |
dc.subject | Information | - |
dc.title | Information revelation in relational contracts | - |
dc.type | Article | - |
dc.description.nature | link_to_subscribed_fulltext | - |
dc.identifier.doi | 10.1093/restud/rdw035 | - |
dc.identifier.scopus | eid_2-s2.0-85014197829 | - |
dc.identifier.volume | 84 | - |
dc.identifier.issue | 1 | - |
dc.identifier.spage | 277 | - |
dc.identifier.epage | 299 | - |
dc.identifier.eissn | 1467-937X | - |
dc.identifier.isi | WOS:000397127400008 | - |
dc.identifier.issnl | 0034-6527 | - |