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- Publisher Website: 10.1111/jems.12167
- Scopus: eid_2-s2.0-84962157129
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Article: When Does Aftermarket Monopolization Soften Foremarket Competition?
| Title | When Does Aftermarket Monopolization Soften Foremarket Competition? |
|---|---|
| Authors | |
| Issue Date | 2016 |
| Citation | Journal of Economics and Management Strategy, 2016, v. 25, n. 4, p. 852-879 How to Cite? |
| Abstract | © 2016 Wiley Periodicals, Inc. This paper investigates firms' abilities to tacitly collude when they each monopolize a proprietary aftermarket. When firms' aftermarkets are completely isolated from foremarket competition, they cannot tacitly collude more easily than single-product firms. However, when their aftermarket power is contested by foremarket competition as equipment owners view new equipment as a substitute for their incumbent firm's aftermarket product, profitable tacit collusion is sustainable among a larger number of firms. Conditions under which introduction of aftermarket competition hinders firms' ability to tacitly collude are characterized. |
| Persistent Identifier | http://hdl.handle.net/10722/269744 |
| ISSN | 2023 Impact Factor: 1.2 2023 SCImago Journal Rankings: 0.961 |
| ISI Accession Number ID |
| DC Field | Value | Language |
|---|---|---|
| dc.contributor.author | Fong, Yuk Fai | - |
| dc.contributor.author | Li, Jin | - |
| dc.contributor.author | Liu, Ke | - |
| dc.date.accessioned | 2019-04-30T01:49:28Z | - |
| dc.date.available | 2019-04-30T01:49:28Z | - |
| dc.date.issued | 2016 | - |
| dc.identifier.citation | Journal of Economics and Management Strategy, 2016, v. 25, n. 4, p. 852-879 | - |
| dc.identifier.issn | 1058-6407 | - |
| dc.identifier.uri | http://hdl.handle.net/10722/269744 | - |
| dc.description.abstract | © 2016 Wiley Periodicals, Inc. This paper investigates firms' abilities to tacitly collude when they each monopolize a proprietary aftermarket. When firms' aftermarkets are completely isolated from foremarket competition, they cannot tacitly collude more easily than single-product firms. However, when their aftermarket power is contested by foremarket competition as equipment owners view new equipment as a substitute for their incumbent firm's aftermarket product, profitable tacit collusion is sustainable among a larger number of firms. Conditions under which introduction of aftermarket competition hinders firms' ability to tacitly collude are characterized. | - |
| dc.language | eng | - |
| dc.relation.ispartof | Journal of Economics and Management Strategy | - |
| dc.title | When Does Aftermarket Monopolization Soften Foremarket Competition? | - |
| dc.type | Article | - |
| dc.description.nature | link_to_subscribed_fulltext | - |
| dc.identifier.doi | 10.1111/jems.12167 | - |
| dc.identifier.scopus | eid_2-s2.0-84962157129 | - |
| dc.identifier.volume | 25 | - |
| dc.identifier.issue | 4 | - |
| dc.identifier.spage | 852 | - |
| dc.identifier.epage | 879 | - |
| dc.identifier.eissn | 1530-9134 | - |
| dc.identifier.isi | WOS:000387408600003 | - |
| dc.identifier.issnl | 1058-6407 | - |