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Article: Bidding in a possibly common-value auction

TitleBidding in a possibly common-value auction
Authors
Fong, Yuk faiGarrett, Daniel F.
KeywordsCommon value
Second-price auction
Model uncertainty
Issue Date2010
Citation
Games and Economic Behavior, 2010, v. 70, n. 2, p. 494-501 How to Cite?
DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2010.02.007
AbstractWe analyze a second-price auction with two bidders in which only one of the bidders is informed as to whether the object is valued commonly. We show that any equilibrium strategy of the bidder who is uninformed must be part of an equilibrium when both bidders instead know that the auction is not common value, regardless of the way in which the values are different. We derive sufficient conditions for equilibrium existence. © 2010 Elsevier Inc.
Persistent Identifierhttp://hdl.handle.net/10722/269690
ISSN
0899-8256
2023 Impact Factor: 1.0
2023 SCImago Journal Rankings: 1.522
ISI Accession Number ID
WOS:000284394500018

 

DC FieldValueLanguage
dc.contributor.authorFong, Yuk fai-
dc.contributor.authorGarrett, Daniel F.-
dc.date.accessioned2019-04-30T01:49:18Z-
dc.date.available2019-04-30T01:49:18Z-
dc.date.issued2010-
dc.identifier.citationGames and Economic Behavior, 2010, v. 70, n. 2, p. 494-501-
dc.identifier.issn0899-8256-
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10722/269690-
dc.description.abstractWe analyze a second-price auction with two bidders in which only one of the bidders is informed as to whether the object is valued commonly. We show that any equilibrium strategy of the bidder who is uninformed must be part of an equilibrium when both bidders instead know that the auction is not common value, regardless of the way in which the values are different. We derive sufficient conditions for equilibrium existence. © 2010 Elsevier Inc.-
dc.languageeng-
dc.relation.ispartofGames and Economic Behavior-
dc.subjectCommon value-
dc.subjectSecond-price auction-
dc.subjectModel uncertainty-
dc.titleBidding in a possibly common-value auction-
dc.typeArticle-
dc.description.naturelink_to_subscribed_fulltext-
dc.identifier.doi10.1016/j.geb.2010.02.007-
dc.identifier.scopuseid_2-s2.0-77349095415-
dc.identifier.volume70-
dc.identifier.issue2-
dc.identifier.spage494-
dc.identifier.epage501-
dc.identifier.eissn1090-2473-
dc.identifier.isiWOS:000284394500018-
dc.identifier.issnl0899-8256-

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