Political meritocracy and relational equality

Abstract

Political meritocracy, the idea of a political system in which the rules and institutions are designed with the aim to distribute formal political power in accordance with competence and moral character, is often regarded as objectionable because, among other reasons, it appears to violate the ideal of egalitarian relations. In this thesis, I argue against this presumptive incompatibility between political meritocracy and the ideal of egalitarian relations.

I begin by arguing that the concept of political meritocracy has a certain plasticity. The analytic concept of political meritocracy is to be distinguished from its substantive conceptions. They represent two levels of deliberations that have often been conflated. By pairing up the distinction between full and partial political meritocracy and the distinction between scalar and threshold conception of qualification, I argue that all plausible theories of political meritocracy can be categorized under the headings of four conceptions, namely guardianship, moderate democratic meritocracy, plural voting, and restricted suffrage. The typology showcases the unique and mutually irreducible logics underlying each conception. The adoption of different notions of political competence and moral character further diversifies the institutional character and political imagination underlying different substantive views of political meritocracy.

After that, I subject the idea of political meritocracy to scrutiny against considerations for relational equality. Through the articulations of the meaning and demands of relational equality, I show the conditions under which some relationships can nonetheless be viewed as valuable despite their inegalitarian character. Since various conceptions of political meritocracy structure socio-political relationships in significantly different fashions, they should be evaluated independently. While guardianship essentially structures socio-political relationships against the ideal of egalitarian relations, this is not necessarily the case for other conceptions of political meritocracy. It follows that it is not obviously clear why the analytic concept of political meritocracy as such should be rejected outright on egalitarian grounds.

By explicating its different facets and variations, this thesis shows that political meritocracy is a rich idea that should not be dismissed outright because of a certain conception. Also, in examining political meritocracy against relational equality, this thesis indirectly contributes to the reflection on the value of equality.