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- Publisher Website: 10.1080/03050629.2017.1373352
- Scopus: eid_2-s2.0-85031107901
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Article: The Politics of Preferential Trade Liberalization in Authoritarian Countries
Title | The Politics of Preferential Trade Liberalization in Authoritarian Countries |
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Authors | |
Keywords | Autocratic regimes elite co-optation elite repression survival strategies trade |
Issue Date | 2018 |
Publisher | Taylor & Francis Inc. The Journal's web site is located at http://www.tandf.co.uk/journals/titles/03050629.asp |
Citation | International Interactions: empirical research in industrial relations, 2018, v. 44 n. 2, p. 189-216 How to Cite? |
Abstract | While autocracies constitute a third of all signatories of preferential trade agreements (PTAs), very little research has explained why some autocrats join PTAs while others do not. We argue that this variation reflects the leader’s degree of vulnerability to elite-led coups during leadership change–whether a leader enters power legally or extralegally. New extralegal leaders are more vulnerable than new legal leaders, which encourages extralegal leaders to use PTAs to both build support from exporters and pressure disloyal importers. We test our hypotheses using a dyadic data set of 120 autocracies from 1960 to 2014. Our results show that extralegal leaders sign more and deeper PTAs than legal leaders. Moreover, we find that extralegal leaders with a high risk of coups are more likely to form deep PTAs than extralegal leaders with a low risk of coups. In line with our argument, we also provide evidence that extralegal leaders sign trade agreements that are likely to be enforced. Our article has implications for the political economy of trade and for development studies. |
Persistent Identifier | http://hdl.handle.net/10722/260325 |
ISSN | 2023 Impact Factor: 1.5 2023 SCImago Journal Rankings: 0.612 |
ISI Accession Number ID |
DC Field | Value | Language |
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dc.contributor.author | Baccini, L | - |
dc.contributor.author | Chow, W | - |
dc.date.accessioned | 2018-09-14T08:39:47Z | - |
dc.date.available | 2018-09-14T08:39:47Z | - |
dc.date.issued | 2018 | - |
dc.identifier.citation | International Interactions: empirical research in industrial relations, 2018, v. 44 n. 2, p. 189-216 | - |
dc.identifier.issn | 0305-0629 | - |
dc.identifier.uri | http://hdl.handle.net/10722/260325 | - |
dc.description.abstract | While autocracies constitute a third of all signatories of preferential trade agreements (PTAs), very little research has explained why some autocrats join PTAs while others do not. We argue that this variation reflects the leader’s degree of vulnerability to elite-led coups during leadership change–whether a leader enters power legally or extralegally. New extralegal leaders are more vulnerable than new legal leaders, which encourages extralegal leaders to use PTAs to both build support from exporters and pressure disloyal importers. We test our hypotheses using a dyadic data set of 120 autocracies from 1960 to 2014. Our results show that extralegal leaders sign more and deeper PTAs than legal leaders. Moreover, we find that extralegal leaders with a high risk of coups are more likely to form deep PTAs than extralegal leaders with a low risk of coups. In line with our argument, we also provide evidence that extralegal leaders sign trade agreements that are likely to be enforced. Our article has implications for the political economy of trade and for development studies. | - |
dc.language | eng | - |
dc.publisher | Taylor & Francis Inc. The Journal's web site is located at http://www.tandf.co.uk/journals/titles/03050629.asp | - |
dc.relation.ispartof | International Interactions: empirical research in industrial relations | - |
dc.rights | Accepted Manuscript (AM) i.e. Postprint This is an Accepted Manuscript of an article published by Taylor & Francis in [International Interactions: empirical research in industrial relations] on [11 Oct 2017], available online: http://www.tandfonline.com/10.1080/03050629.2017.1373352 | - |
dc.subject | Autocratic regimes | - |
dc.subject | elite co-optation | - |
dc.subject | elite repression | - |
dc.subject | survival strategies | - |
dc.subject | trade | - |
dc.title | The Politics of Preferential Trade Liberalization in Authoritarian Countries | - |
dc.type | Article | - |
dc.identifier.email | Chow, W: wilfred.chow@hku.hk | - |
dc.identifier.authority | Chow, W=rp02057 | - |
dc.description.nature | postprint | - |
dc.identifier.doi | 10.1080/03050629.2017.1373352 | - |
dc.identifier.scopus | eid_2-s2.0-85031107901 | - |
dc.identifier.hkuros | 291150 | - |
dc.identifier.volume | 44 | - |
dc.identifier.issue | 2 | - |
dc.identifier.spage | 189 | - |
dc.identifier.epage | 216 | - |
dc.identifier.isi | WOS:000425699400001 | - |
dc.publisher.place | United States | - |
dc.identifier.issnl | 0305-0629 | - |