Do Anticorruption Campaigns Boost Trust in Government? Evidence from China

Abstract

Governments launch anticorruption campaigns to regain political trust, but the campaigns may strengthen corruption perceptions and potentially decrease trust. We examine the campaigns’ effect on political trust using the case of the anticorruption drive in China, by combining longitudinal data from a national survey and field interviews. Difference-in- Differences models show that stronger anticorruption efforts can increase political trust. However, different social groups increase trust to different levels, depending on their reliance on process-based or propaganda-based trust generation mechanisms. State-system insiders (e.g., civil servants) tend to increase trust less than outsiders because of their direct experience of radical implementation processes and ineffective campaign outcomes. Those who are better educated and who possess alternative information are more critical of anticorruption propaganda, and increase trust less than those less informed. Therefore, political trust has been more effectively increased by anticorruption campaigns for the grassroots than for the elite in China.