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Article: Truth(making) by Convention
Title | Truth(making) by Convention |
---|---|
Authors | |
Issue Date | 2020 |
Publisher | University of Illinois Press. The Journal's web site is located at http://www.press.uillinois.edu/journals/apq.html |
Citation | American Philosophical Quarterly, 2020, v. 57 n. 2, p. 117-128 How to Cite? |
Abstract | A common account of the distinction between analytic and synthetic truths is that while the former are true solely in virtue of meaning, the latter are true also in virtue of the way of the world. Quine famously disputed this characterization, and his skepticism over the analytic/synthetic distinction has cast a long shadow. Against this skepticism, I argue that the common account comes close to the truth, and that truthmaker theory in particular offers the resources for providing a compelling account of the distinction that preserves the basic ideas behind it, and avoids the standard criticisms facing the distinction. In particular, I argue that analytic truths are truths that ontologically depend in no way whatsoever upon what exists. |
Persistent Identifier | http://hdl.handle.net/10722/258298 |
ISSN | 2023 Impact Factor: 0.8 2023 SCImago Journal Rankings: 0.798 |
DC Field | Value | Language |
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dc.contributor.author | Asay, J | - |
dc.date.accessioned | 2018-08-22T01:36:13Z | - |
dc.date.available | 2018-08-22T01:36:13Z | - |
dc.date.issued | 2020 | - |
dc.identifier.citation | American Philosophical Quarterly, 2020, v. 57 n. 2, p. 117-128 | - |
dc.identifier.issn | 0003-0481 | - |
dc.identifier.uri | http://hdl.handle.net/10722/258298 | - |
dc.description.abstract | A common account of the distinction between analytic and synthetic truths is that while the former are true solely in virtue of meaning, the latter are true also in virtue of the way of the world. Quine famously disputed this characterization, and his skepticism over the analytic/synthetic distinction has cast a long shadow. Against this skepticism, I argue that the common account comes close to the truth, and that truthmaker theory in particular offers the resources for providing a compelling account of the distinction that preserves the basic ideas behind it, and avoids the standard criticisms facing the distinction. In particular, I argue that analytic truths are truths that ontologically depend in no way whatsoever upon what exists. | - |
dc.language | eng | - |
dc.publisher | University of Illinois Press. The Journal's web site is located at http://www.press.uillinois.edu/journals/apq.html | - |
dc.relation.ispartof | American Philosophical Quarterly | - |
dc.rights | Copyright University of Illinois Press. The articles will not be photocopied, distributed, or used for purposes other than the terms agreed to by UIP | - |
dc.title | Truth(making) by Convention | - |
dc.type | Article | - |
dc.identifier.email | Asay, J: asay@hku.hk | - |
dc.identifier.authority | Asay, J=rp01955 | - |
dc.description.nature | postprint | - |
dc.identifier.hkuros | 287096 | - |
dc.identifier.volume | 57 | - |
dc.identifier.issue | 2 | - |
dc.identifier.spage | 117 | - |
dc.identifier.epage | 128 | - |
dc.publisher.place | United States | - |
dc.identifier.issnl | 0003-0481 | - |