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Article: The Role of Truth in Psychological Science
Title | The Role of Truth in Psychological Science |
---|---|
Authors | |
Keywords | correspondence deflationism realism truth truthmakers |
Issue Date | 2018 |
Publisher | Sage Publications Ltd. The Journal's web site is located at http://www.sagepub.co.uk/journal.aspx?pid=105793 |
Citation | Theory & Psychology, 2018, v. 28 n. 3, p. 382-397 How to Cite? |
Abstract | In their 2012 article, Haig and Borsboom explore the relevance of the theory of truth for psychological science. Although they conclude that correspondence theories of truth are best suited to offer the resources for making sense of scientific practice, they leave open the possibility that other theories might accomplish those same ends. I argue that deflationary theories of truth, which deny that there is any substantive property that unifies the class of truths, make equally good sense of scientific practice as the correspondence theory, but at a lesser theoretical cost. I also argue that the considerations Haig and Borsboom draw on are better thought of as issues relevant to realism, and thus separate from the theory of truth. I conclude that while they are correct to engage questions about what makes true the various claims that arise in psychological research, they may do so without saddling themselves with a correspondence theory. |
Persistent Identifier | http://hdl.handle.net/10722/258297 |
ISSN | 2023 Impact Factor: 1.1 2023 SCImago Journal Rankings: 0.436 |
ISI Accession Number ID |
DC Field | Value | Language |
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dc.contributor.author | Asay, JF | - |
dc.date.accessioned | 2018-08-22T01:36:11Z | - |
dc.date.available | 2018-08-22T01:36:11Z | - |
dc.date.issued | 2018 | - |
dc.identifier.citation | Theory & Psychology, 2018, v. 28 n. 3, p. 382-397 | - |
dc.identifier.issn | 0959-3543 | - |
dc.identifier.uri | http://hdl.handle.net/10722/258297 | - |
dc.description.abstract | In their 2012 article, Haig and Borsboom explore the relevance of the theory of truth for psychological science. Although they conclude that correspondence theories of truth are best suited to offer the resources for making sense of scientific practice, they leave open the possibility that other theories might accomplish those same ends. I argue that deflationary theories of truth, which deny that there is any substantive property that unifies the class of truths, make equally good sense of scientific practice as the correspondence theory, but at a lesser theoretical cost. I also argue that the considerations Haig and Borsboom draw on are better thought of as issues relevant to realism, and thus separate from the theory of truth. I conclude that while they are correct to engage questions about what makes true the various claims that arise in psychological research, they may do so without saddling themselves with a correspondence theory. | - |
dc.language | eng | - |
dc.publisher | Sage Publications Ltd. The Journal's web site is located at http://www.sagepub.co.uk/journal.aspx?pid=105793 | - |
dc.relation.ispartof | Theory & Psychology | - |
dc.rights | Theory & Psychology. Copyright © Sage Publications Ltd. | - |
dc.subject | correspondence | - |
dc.subject | deflationism | - |
dc.subject | realism | - |
dc.subject | truth | - |
dc.subject | truthmakers | - |
dc.title | The Role of Truth in Psychological Science | - |
dc.type | Article | - |
dc.identifier.email | Asay, JF: asay@hku.hk | - |
dc.identifier.authority | Asay, JF=rp01955 | - |
dc.description.nature | postprint | - |
dc.identifier.doi | 10.1177/0959354317752875 | - |
dc.identifier.scopus | eid_2-s2.0-85047550247 | - |
dc.identifier.hkuros | 287095 | - |
dc.identifier.volume | 28 | - |
dc.identifier.issue | 3 | - |
dc.identifier.spage | 382 | - |
dc.identifier.epage | 397 | - |
dc.identifier.isi | WOS:000433009800006 | - |
dc.publisher.place | United Kingdom | - |
dc.identifier.issnl | 0959-3543 | - |