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- Publisher Website: 10.2308/accr-50688
- Scopus: eid_2-s2.0-84903118831
- WOS: WOS:000336693700006
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Article: Ceo turnover, financial distress, and contractual innovations
| Title | Ceo turnover, financial distress, and contractual innovations |
|---|---|
| Authors | |
| Keywords | Chapter 11 Corporate governance Debtor in Possession (DIP) financing Incentive contracts Key Employee Retention Plans (KERPs) CEO turnover Bankruptcy |
| Issue Date | 2014 |
| Citation | Accounting Review, 2014, v. 89, n. 3, p. 959-990 How to Cite? |
| Abstract | The design of CEO incentives is particularly important for firms in financial distress. We compare the resolution of CEO incentive problems in distressed firms between the 1980s versus the 1990s, focusing on how changes in contractual provisions, as well as in the executive labor market, resulted in a shift to a new equilibrium. Our analyses provide evidence that the increased bargaining power of creditors, together with changes in the use of contractual provisions in the 1990s, enabled creditors to more effectively retain highly skilled CEOs with firm-specific knowledge and provide them with incentives to improve firm performance. |
| Persistent Identifier | http://hdl.handle.net/10722/256667 |
| ISSN | 2023 Impact Factor: 4.4 2023 SCImago Journal Rankings: 4.640 |
| ISI Accession Number ID |
| DC Field | Value | Language |
|---|---|---|
| dc.contributor.author | Evans, John Harry | - |
| dc.contributor.author | Luo, Shuqing | - |
| dc.contributor.author | Nagarajan, Nandu J. | - |
| dc.date.accessioned | 2018-07-24T08:57:33Z | - |
| dc.date.available | 2018-07-24T08:57:33Z | - |
| dc.date.issued | 2014 | - |
| dc.identifier.citation | Accounting Review, 2014, v. 89, n. 3, p. 959-990 | - |
| dc.identifier.issn | 0001-4826 | - |
| dc.identifier.uri | http://hdl.handle.net/10722/256667 | - |
| dc.description.abstract | The design of CEO incentives is particularly important for firms in financial distress. We compare the resolution of CEO incentive problems in distressed firms between the 1980s versus the 1990s, focusing on how changes in contractual provisions, as well as in the executive labor market, resulted in a shift to a new equilibrium. Our analyses provide evidence that the increased bargaining power of creditors, together with changes in the use of contractual provisions in the 1990s, enabled creditors to more effectively retain highly skilled CEOs with firm-specific knowledge and provide them with incentives to improve firm performance. | - |
| dc.language | eng | - |
| dc.relation.ispartof | Accounting Review | - |
| dc.subject | Chapter 11 | - |
| dc.subject | Corporate governance | - |
| dc.subject | Debtor in Possession (DIP) financing | - |
| dc.subject | Incentive contracts | - |
| dc.subject | Key Employee Retention Plans (KERPs) | - |
| dc.subject | CEO turnover | - |
| dc.subject | Bankruptcy | - |
| dc.title | Ceo turnover, financial distress, and contractual innovations | - |
| dc.type | Article | - |
| dc.description.nature | link_to_subscribed_fulltext | - |
| dc.identifier.doi | 10.2308/accr-50688 | - |
| dc.identifier.scopus | eid_2-s2.0-84903118831 | - |
| dc.identifier.volume | 89 | - |
| dc.identifier.issue | 3 | - |
| dc.identifier.spage | 959 | - |
| dc.identifier.epage | 990 | - |
| dc.identifier.isi | WOS:000336693700006 | - |
| dc.identifier.issnl | 0001-4826 | - |