The Dispositional Interpretation of the DGZ Bohmian Ontology

Abstract

Bohmian Mechanics (as presented in Dürr et al 1992) is being regarded more and more as an attractive quantum theory because it provides a clear ontology, consisting of particles and one universal wave-function (Dürr et al 1992, Dürr et al. 1995). However, this is true only prima facie because the status of the wave-function remains controversial for several reasons (Belot 2012, Esfeld 2013). In my talk I will show how the debate on the wave-function is leading to a completely new way of understanding not only the ontology of Bohmian Mechanics, but also the fundamental building blocks of any physical theory (the so called ‘primitive ontology’). In particular, I will discuss the dispositional approach, which regards the wave-function as a nomological entity grounded in one dispositional property instantiated by some ‘primitive stuff’ (Esfeld et al. 2013, Esfeld et al. 2014). In my conclusion I will point out the challenges and the problems that this approach has to face, and I will suggest that it cannot be regarded as a definite and final solution to the question on the status of the wave-function.