File Download

There are no files associated with this item.

  Links for fulltext
     (May Require Subscription)
Supplementary

Article: When customers anticipate liquidation sales: Managing operations under financial distress

TitleWhen customers anticipate liquidation sales: Managing operations under financial distress
Authors
KeywordsDeferred discount
Strategic customers
Store credit
Rebate
Pricing
Liquidation sale
Inventory
Financial distress
Issue Date2017
Citation
Manufacturing and Service Operations Management, 2017, v. 19, n. 4, p. 657-673 How to Cite?
Abstract© 2017 INFORMS. The presence of strategic customers may force an already financially distressed firm into a death spiral: sensing the firm’s financial di culty, customers may wait strategically for deep discounts in liquidation sales. In turn, such waiting lowers the firm’s profitability and increases the firm’s bankruptcy risk. Using a two-period model to capture these dynamics, this paper identifies customers’ strategic waiting behavior as a source of a firm’s cost of financial distress. We also find that customers’ anticipation of bankruptcy can be self-fulfilling: when customers anticipate a high bankruptcy probability, they prefer to delay their purchases, making the firm more likely to go bankrupt than when customers anticipate a low probability of bankruptcy. Such behavior has important operational and financial implications. First, the firm acts more conservatively when facing either more severe financial distress or a large share of strategic customers. As its financial situation deteriorates, the firm lowers inventory alone when financial distress is mild or only a small share of customers are strategic and lowers both inventory and price in the presence of severe financial distress and a large fraction of strategic customers. Under optimal price and inventory decisions, strategic waiting accounts for a large part of the firm’s total cost of financial distress, although a larger proportion of strategic customers may result in a lower probability of bankruptcy. In addition to inventory reduction and (immediate) price discount, we find that a deferred discount, in the form of rebates and/or store credits for future purchases, can act as an e ective mechanism to mitigate strategic waiting. As a contingent price reduction, deferred discounts align the interests of customers and the firm and are most e ective when the fraction of strategic customers is high and the firm’s financial distress is at a medium level.
Persistent Identifierhttp://hdl.handle.net/10722/251283
ISSN
2021 Impact Factor: 7.103
2020 SCImago Journal Rankings: 7.372
ISI Accession Number ID

 

DC FieldValueLanguage
dc.contributor.authorBirge, John R.-
dc.contributor.authorParker, Rodney P.-
dc.contributor.authorWu, Michelle Xiao-
dc.contributor.authorYang, S. Alex-
dc.date.accessioned2018-02-01T08:43:03Z-
dc.date.available2018-02-01T08:43:03Z-
dc.date.issued2017-
dc.identifier.citationManufacturing and Service Operations Management, 2017, v. 19, n. 4, p. 657-673-
dc.identifier.issn1523-4614-
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10722/251283-
dc.description.abstract© 2017 INFORMS. The presence of strategic customers may force an already financially distressed firm into a death spiral: sensing the firm’s financial di culty, customers may wait strategically for deep discounts in liquidation sales. In turn, such waiting lowers the firm’s profitability and increases the firm’s bankruptcy risk. Using a two-period model to capture these dynamics, this paper identifies customers’ strategic waiting behavior as a source of a firm’s cost of financial distress. We also find that customers’ anticipation of bankruptcy can be self-fulfilling: when customers anticipate a high bankruptcy probability, they prefer to delay their purchases, making the firm more likely to go bankrupt than when customers anticipate a low probability of bankruptcy. Such behavior has important operational and financial implications. First, the firm acts more conservatively when facing either more severe financial distress or a large share of strategic customers. As its financial situation deteriorates, the firm lowers inventory alone when financial distress is mild or only a small share of customers are strategic and lowers both inventory and price in the presence of severe financial distress and a large fraction of strategic customers. Under optimal price and inventory decisions, strategic waiting accounts for a large part of the firm’s total cost of financial distress, although a larger proportion of strategic customers may result in a lower probability of bankruptcy. In addition to inventory reduction and (immediate) price discount, we find that a deferred discount, in the form of rebates and/or store credits for future purchases, can act as an e ective mechanism to mitigate strategic waiting. As a contingent price reduction, deferred discounts align the interests of customers and the firm and are most e ective when the fraction of strategic customers is high and the firm’s financial distress is at a medium level.-
dc.languageeng-
dc.relation.ispartofManufacturing and Service Operations Management-
dc.subjectDeferred discount-
dc.subjectStrategic customers-
dc.subjectStore credit-
dc.subjectRebate-
dc.subjectPricing-
dc.subjectLiquidation sale-
dc.subjectInventory-
dc.subjectFinancial distress-
dc.titleWhen customers anticipate liquidation sales: Managing operations under financial distress-
dc.typeArticle-
dc.description.naturelink_to_subscribed_fulltext-
dc.identifier.doi10.1287/msom.2017.0634-
dc.identifier.scopuseid_2-s2.0-85032004657-
dc.identifier.volume19-
dc.identifier.issue4-
dc.identifier.spage657-
dc.identifier.epage673-
dc.identifier.eissn1526-5498-
dc.identifier.isiWOS:000423271600010-
dc.identifier.issnl1523-4614-

Export via OAI-PMH Interface in XML Formats


OR


Export to Other Non-XML Formats