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Article: The institutional and cultural logics of legal commensuration: Blood money and negotiated justice in China
Title | The institutional and cultural logics of legal commensuration: Blood money and negotiated justice in China |
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Authors | |
Issue Date | 2017 |
Citation | American Journal of Sociology, 2017, v. 122, n. 4, p. 1104-1143 How to Cite? |
Abstract | © 2017 by The University of Chicago. All rights reserved. Legal commensuration is a complex mechanism of valuation. It entails social exchanges among parties in the litigational context. The way the law evaluates the unevaluable is guided by many specific facts about the parties and is influenced by its own institutional priorities. The criminal reconciliation process in China is used as a real-world empirical illustration. Drawing mainly on data collected from fieldwork investigation of two basic-level courts, this article identifies two factors that affect the process and outcome of legal commensuration: institutional interests promoting reconciliation and the cultural meanings of money. Political considerations play a decisive role in incentivizing judges to facilitate reconciliation. But the cultural meanings of money also shape judicial outcomes. In particular, blood money is valued both for its certainty and its symbolic value as a token of apology. Through a brief comparison of the Chinese and U.S. courts, the article shows that our emphasis on process can generate a more socially grounded understanding of legal commensuration. |
Persistent Identifier | http://hdl.handle.net/10722/251205 |
ISSN | 2023 Impact Factor: 4.4 2023 SCImago Journal Rankings: 2.290 |
ISI Accession Number ID |
DC Field | Value | Language |
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dc.contributor.author | Ng, Kwai Hang | - |
dc.contributor.author | He, Xin | - |
dc.date.accessioned | 2018-02-01T01:54:54Z | - |
dc.date.available | 2018-02-01T01:54:54Z | - |
dc.date.issued | 2017 | - |
dc.identifier.citation | American Journal of Sociology, 2017, v. 122, n. 4, p. 1104-1143 | - |
dc.identifier.issn | 0002-9602 | - |
dc.identifier.uri | http://hdl.handle.net/10722/251205 | - |
dc.description.abstract | © 2017 by The University of Chicago. All rights reserved. Legal commensuration is a complex mechanism of valuation. It entails social exchanges among parties in the litigational context. The way the law evaluates the unevaluable is guided by many specific facts about the parties and is influenced by its own institutional priorities. The criminal reconciliation process in China is used as a real-world empirical illustration. Drawing mainly on data collected from fieldwork investigation of two basic-level courts, this article identifies two factors that affect the process and outcome of legal commensuration: institutional interests promoting reconciliation and the cultural meanings of money. Political considerations play a decisive role in incentivizing judges to facilitate reconciliation. But the cultural meanings of money also shape judicial outcomes. In particular, blood money is valued both for its certainty and its symbolic value as a token of apology. Through a brief comparison of the Chinese and U.S. courts, the article shows that our emphasis on process can generate a more socially grounded understanding of legal commensuration. | - |
dc.language | eng | - |
dc.relation.ispartof | American Journal of Sociology | - |
dc.title | The institutional and cultural logics of legal commensuration: Blood money and negotiated justice in China | - |
dc.type | Article | - |
dc.description.nature | published_or_final_version | - |
dc.identifier.doi | 10.1086/689268 | - |
dc.identifier.scopus | eid_2-s2.0-85013819503 | - |
dc.identifier.hkuros | 295371 | - |
dc.identifier.volume | 122 | - |
dc.identifier.issue | 4 | - |
dc.identifier.spage | 1104 | - |
dc.identifier.epage | 1143 | - |
dc.identifier.isi | WOS:000395456100003 | - |
dc.identifier.issnl | 0002-9602 | - |