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Article: Strategic Public Shaming: Evidence from Chinese Antitrust Investigations
Title | Strategic Public Shaming: Evidence from Chinese Antitrust Investigations |
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Authors | |
Keywords | Antitrust China Competition Regulation Reputation |
Issue Date | 2019 |
Publisher | Cambridge University Press. The Journal's web site is located at http://journals.cambridge.org/action/displayJournal?jid=CQY |
Citation | The China Quarterly, 2019, v. 237, p. 174-195 How to Cite? |
Abstract | This article examines strategic public shaming, a novel form of regulatory tactics employed by the National Development and Reform Commission (NDRC) during its enforcement of the Anti-Monopoly Law. Based on analysis of media coverage and interview findings, the study finds that the way that the NDRC disclosed its investigation is highly strategic depending on the firm's co-operative attitude towards the investigation. Event studies further show that the NDRC's proactive disclosure resulted in significantly negative abnormal returns of the stock prices of the firm subject to the disclosure. For instance, Biostime, an infant-formula manufacturer investigated in 2013, experienced −22 per cent cumulative abnormal return in a three-day event window, resulting in a loss of market capitalization that is 27 times the antitrust fine that it ultimately received. The NDRC's strategic public shaming might therefore result in severe market sanctions that deter firms from defying the agency. |
Persistent Identifier | http://hdl.handle.net/10722/250827 |
ISSN | 2023 Impact Factor: 2.5 2023 SCImago Journal Rankings: 0.716 |
SSRN | |
ISI Accession Number ID |
DC Field | Value | Language |
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dc.contributor.author | Zhang, HA | - |
dc.date.accessioned | 2018-01-29T06:52:47Z | - |
dc.date.available | 2018-01-29T06:52:47Z | - |
dc.date.issued | 2019 | - |
dc.identifier.citation | The China Quarterly, 2019, v. 237, p. 174-195 | - |
dc.identifier.issn | 0305-7410 | - |
dc.identifier.uri | http://hdl.handle.net/10722/250827 | - |
dc.description.abstract | This article examines strategic public shaming, a novel form of regulatory tactics employed by the National Development and Reform Commission (NDRC) during its enforcement of the Anti-Monopoly Law. Based on analysis of media coverage and interview findings, the study finds that the way that the NDRC disclosed its investigation is highly strategic depending on the firm's co-operative attitude towards the investigation. Event studies further show that the NDRC's proactive disclosure resulted in significantly negative abnormal returns of the stock prices of the firm subject to the disclosure. For instance, Biostime, an infant-formula manufacturer investigated in 2013, experienced −22 per cent cumulative abnormal return in a three-day event window, resulting in a loss of market capitalization that is 27 times the antitrust fine that it ultimately received. The NDRC's strategic public shaming might therefore result in severe market sanctions that deter firms from defying the agency. | - |
dc.language | eng | - |
dc.publisher | Cambridge University Press. The Journal's web site is located at http://journals.cambridge.org/action/displayJournal?jid=CQY | - |
dc.relation.ispartof | The China Quarterly | - |
dc.rights | The China Quarterly. Copyright © Cambridge University Press. | - |
dc.rights | This article has been published in a revised form in The China Quarterly http://doi.org/10.1017/S0305741018001340. This version is free to view and download for private research and study only. Not for re-distribution, re-sale or use in derivative works. © SOAS University of London 2019. | - |
dc.subject | Antitrust | - |
dc.subject | China | - |
dc.subject | Competition | - |
dc.subject | Regulation | - |
dc.subject | Reputation | - |
dc.title | Strategic Public Shaming: Evidence from Chinese Antitrust Investigations | - |
dc.type | Article | - |
dc.identifier.email | Zhang, HA: angelaz@hku.hk | - |
dc.identifier.authority | Zhang, HA=rp02279 | - |
dc.description.nature | postprint | - |
dc.identifier.doi | 10.1017/S0305741018001340 | - |
dc.identifier.scopus | eid_2-s2.0-85059823679 | - |
dc.identifier.hkuros | 287428 | - |
dc.identifier.volume | 237 | - |
dc.identifier.spage | 174 | - |
dc.identifier.epage | 195 | - |
dc.identifier.isi | WOS:000461101700009 | - |
dc.publisher.place | United Kingdom | - |
dc.identifier.ssrn | 2943268 | - |
dc.identifier.hkulrp | 2018/003 | - |
dc.identifier.issnl | 0305-7410 | - |