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Article: Debiasing Regulators: The Behavioral Economics of US Administrative Law
Title | Debiasing Regulators: The Behavioral Economics of US Administrative Law |
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Authors | |
Keywords | administrative law behavioral law and economics behavioral public choice biases and heuristics judicial review regulation |
Issue Date | 2017 |
Publisher | Sage Publications Ltd. The Journal's web site is located at http://www.sagepub.com/journals/Journal202317 |
Citation | Common Law World Review, 2017, v. 46 n. 3, p. 171-197 How to Cite? |
Abstract | Behavioral economics has revolutionized American legal scholarship in many areas of law, but not in administrative law, the law that regulates the regulators. This article theorizes that the administrative law doctrines developed by the Supreme Court of the United States strikingly resemble a system of ‘debiasing’ devices developed to counteract bureaucratic and judicial behavioral failures in just the areas that they matter most. A strong, alternative, justification may thus exist for the enduring paradox of American administrative law that administrators should be prepared to have their substantive decisions scrutinized by ‘hard look’ reviewing courts, while judges should be ready to defer to agencies on questions of statutory interpretation. |
Persistent Identifier | http://hdl.handle.net/10722/248413 |
ISSN | |
SSRN |
DC Field | Value | Language |
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dc.contributor.author | Ip, EC | - |
dc.date.accessioned | 2017-10-18T08:42:48Z | - |
dc.date.available | 2017-10-18T08:42:48Z | - |
dc.date.issued | 2017 | - |
dc.identifier.citation | Common Law World Review, 2017, v. 46 n. 3, p. 171-197 | - |
dc.identifier.issn | 1473-7795 | - |
dc.identifier.uri | http://hdl.handle.net/10722/248413 | - |
dc.description.abstract | Behavioral economics has revolutionized American legal scholarship in many areas of law, but not in administrative law, the law that regulates the regulators. This article theorizes that the administrative law doctrines developed by the Supreme Court of the United States strikingly resemble a system of ‘debiasing’ devices developed to counteract bureaucratic and judicial behavioral failures in just the areas that they matter most. A strong, alternative, justification may thus exist for the enduring paradox of American administrative law that administrators should be prepared to have their substantive decisions scrutinized by ‘hard look’ reviewing courts, while judges should be ready to defer to agencies on questions of statutory interpretation. | - |
dc.language | eng | - |
dc.publisher | Sage Publications Ltd. The Journal's web site is located at http://www.sagepub.com/journals/Journal202317 | - |
dc.relation.ispartof | Common Law World Review | - |
dc.rights | Common Law World Review. Copyright © Sage Publications Ltd. | - |
dc.subject | administrative law | - |
dc.subject | behavioral law and economics | - |
dc.subject | behavioral public choice | - |
dc.subject | biases and heuristics | - |
dc.subject | judicial review | - |
dc.subject | regulation | - |
dc.title | Debiasing Regulators: The Behavioral Economics of US Administrative Law | - |
dc.type | Article | - |
dc.identifier.email | Ip, CYE: ericcip@hku.hk | - |
dc.identifier.authority | Ip, CYE=rp02161 | - |
dc.identifier.doi | 10.1177/1473779517725507 | - |
dc.identifier.hkuros | 279999 | - |
dc.identifier.volume | 46 | - |
dc.identifier.issue | 3 | - |
dc.identifier.spage | 171 | - |
dc.identifier.epage | 197 | - |
dc.publisher.place | United Kingdom | - |
dc.identifier.ssrn | 3471479 | - |
dc.identifier.hkulrp | 2019/087 | - |
dc.identifier.issnl | 1473-7795 | - |