Regulating government ethics in China

Abstract

Public corruption can be broadly viewed as a continuum from minor government ethics violations to major criminal corruption (mainly in the forms of embezzlement, bribery, or fraud). Criminal enforcement through investigation, prosecution, and criminal penalties is the typical response to traditional criminal corruption. This is important but not enough for a clean government. Since the 1960s, many countries, such as the United States and the United Kingdom, have established systematic regulatory systems against corruption. The regulatory systems in these relatively clean countries are reflected in mainly three aspects: making regulations (conflicts of interest, appearance of corruption, financial disclosure, and outside employment), establishing specialised regulatory bodies, and unique enforcement methods compared with criminal enforcement. However, such a systematic regulatory system has only just begun to emerge in China.

This thesis focuses on government ethics rules and their enforcement in China (as well as in three other jurisdictions for comparative insights). Empirical research methods were employed to explore the dynamics of actual enforcement policies and practices in China. Specifically speaking, 30 government ethics regulatory officials and 15 officials under regulation in three provinces were interviewed. Internal documents of regulatory agencies and data from questionnaires were also examined to cross check the information derived from interviews to increase the reliability of the data.

The thesis formed an analytical framework through reviewing existing theories on government ethics regulation and general regulation literature and analyzing government ethics rules in the US, the UK, and Hong Kong. Using this framework, it seeks to explore the patterns and features of government ethics rules and their enforcement in China. The thesis concludes that the inadequacy of government rules per se – the existing rules have not yet regulated much of the unethical behaviour of government officials (such as representing a third party in dealing with the government, the appearance of using official influence for private purposes) – and the deterrence-oriented criminal enforcement style of government ethics regulation are important but ignored elements of the problem of rampant corruption in China.

Such analysis has generated important and practical policy implications for China’s government ethics rules and their enforcement. For government ethics rule making, the reform of government rules must fill the identified gap. With respect to enforcement, the research calls for a compliance-oriented government ethics enforcement style in China which requires a government ethics enforcement agency separated from its criminal enforcement system which is dominated by Party Discipline Inspection Committees. These reform suggestions have special applicability for China because fighting corruption through strengthening such a regulatory regime will not damage the ruling legitimacy of the Chinese Communist Party and thus will not encounter strong resistance from the top leadership.