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- Publisher Website: 10.1080/0020174X.2016.1220639
- Scopus: eid_2-s2.0-84986238355
- WOS: WOS:000396784100004
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Article: Demythologizing intuition
Title | Demythologizing intuition |
---|---|
Authors | |
Keywords | epistemology philosophical methodology metaphilosophy Intuition |
Issue Date | 2017 |
Citation | Inquiry (United Kingdom), 2017, v. 60, n. 4, p. 386-402 How to Cite? |
Abstract | © 2017 Informa UK Limited, trading as Taylor & Francis Group. Max Deutschâs new book argues against the commonly held âmythâ that philosophical methodology characteristically employs intuitions as evidence. While I am sympathetic to the general claim that philosophical methodology has been grossly oversimplified in the intuition literature, the particular claim that it is a myth that philosophers rely on intuitions as evidence is open to several very different interpretations. The plausibility and consequences of a rejection of the âmythâ will depend on the notion of evidence one employs, the notion of intuition one holds, and how one understands the idea of ârelying onâ or âemployingâ something as evidence. I describe what I take to be the version of The Myth which is most plausibly undermined by Deutschâs arguments; however, I also argue that the falsity of this myth has only minimal consequences for the viability of the experimental philosophy research project. |
Persistent Identifier | http://hdl.handle.net/10722/244278 |
ISSN | 2023 Impact Factor: 1.0 2023 SCImago Journal Rankings: 0.769 |
ISI Accession Number ID |
DC Field | Value | Language |
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dc.contributor.author | Nado, Jennifer | - |
dc.date.accessioned | 2017-08-31T08:56:32Z | - |
dc.date.available | 2017-08-31T08:56:32Z | - |
dc.date.issued | 2017 | - |
dc.identifier.citation | Inquiry (United Kingdom), 2017, v. 60, n. 4, p. 386-402 | - |
dc.identifier.issn | 0020-174X | - |
dc.identifier.uri | http://hdl.handle.net/10722/244278 | - |
dc.description.abstract | © 2017 Informa UK Limited, trading as Taylor & Francis Group. Max Deutschâs new book argues against the commonly held âmythâ that philosophical methodology characteristically employs intuitions as evidence. While I am sympathetic to the general claim that philosophical methodology has been grossly oversimplified in the intuition literature, the particular claim that it is a myth that philosophers rely on intuitions as evidence is open to several very different interpretations. The plausibility and consequences of a rejection of the âmythâ will depend on the notion of evidence one employs, the notion of intuition one holds, and how one understands the idea of ârelying onâ or âemployingâ something as evidence. I describe what I take to be the version of The Myth which is most plausibly undermined by Deutschâs arguments; however, I also argue that the falsity of this myth has only minimal consequences for the viability of the experimental philosophy research project. | - |
dc.language | eng | - |
dc.relation.ispartof | Inquiry (United Kingdom) | - |
dc.subject | epistemology | - |
dc.subject | philosophical methodology | - |
dc.subject | metaphilosophy | - |
dc.subject | Intuition | - |
dc.title | Demythologizing intuition | - |
dc.type | Article | - |
dc.description.nature | link_to_subscribed_fulltext | - |
dc.identifier.doi | 10.1080/0020174X.2016.1220639 | - |
dc.identifier.scopus | eid_2-s2.0-84986238355 | - |
dc.identifier.volume | 60 | - |
dc.identifier.issue | 4 | - |
dc.identifier.spage | 386 | - |
dc.identifier.epage | 402 | - |
dc.identifier.eissn | 1502-3923 | - |
dc.identifier.isi | WOS:000396784100004 | - |
dc.identifier.issnl | 0020-174X | - |