Communicating and Excommunicating Hate

Abstract

Language philosopher J. L. Austin observes that language does not only describe the world but acts upon it. Building on Austin’s ideas, John Searle developed the Speech Act theory, according to which every speech act is comprised of four essential ingredients: state of mind (intent/belief/feeling), locution (what is said), illocution (what is meant), and perlocution (the resulting effects). Moreover, whether a speech act can achieve its intended effects depends on felicity conditions (such as appropriate audience and circumstances, conventions, sincerity, and completeness), which are socially and contextually determined. This paper applies Speech Act theory to the analysis of hate speech. I will firstly describe cross-jurisdictional divergence in the elements of hate speech they focus on, which not only leads to the practical challenge of regulating hate speech in a borderless online world, but also raises philosophical questions about competing rationales behind hate speech regulation. Anti-hate approaches, as in European jurisprudence, focus on the content of speech (e.g., whether the utterances concerned are racist or xenophobic); pro-speech approaches, as in American jurisprudence, instead proscribe speech based on likelihood of immediate harm (e.g., incitement of lawless action or threat against a specific person). I will then discuss how the modern technological environment presents distinctive analytical challenges to each of these traditions, driving them even further apart.