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Article: Should Scientists Think?: Comment on Machado and Silva (2007)

TitleShould Scientists Think?: Comment on Machado and Silva (2007)
Authors
Keywordsfree will
volition
Libet
intention
consciousness
Issue Date2007
Citation
American Psychologist, 2007, v. 62, n. 7, p. 686-688 How to Cite?
AbstractThe author has previously claimed that neural activity in a medial frontal brain area represents conscious motor intentions. A. Machado and F. J. Silva (2007) attempted to challenge this claim by arguing that such intentions are not necessarily causally effective and must be caused by something else, so that they therefore cannot be the unmoved first movers in action. The author's reply is that he made no such claims about the causal status and origin of conscious intentions. In fact, he has elsewhere presented empirical evidence in support of the idea that intentions are not necessarily causal. But this does not stop researchers from studying the neural basis for the conscious impression that one intends and wills one's actions. One can feel and attend to such intentions, be they causal or not. The author's claim is that there is neural activity in the medial frontal wall that reflects such conscious feelings. Other recent empirical evidence that supports this view is described. © 2007 American Psychological Association.
Persistent Identifierhttp://hdl.handle.net/10722/242599
ISSN
2023 Impact Factor: 12.3
2023 SCImago Journal Rankings: 3.357
ISI Accession Number ID

 

DC FieldValueLanguage
dc.contributor.authorLau, Hakwan C.-
dc.date.accessioned2017-08-10T10:51:05Z-
dc.date.available2017-08-10T10:51:05Z-
dc.date.issued2007-
dc.identifier.citationAmerican Psychologist, 2007, v. 62, n. 7, p. 686-688-
dc.identifier.issn0003-066X-
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10722/242599-
dc.description.abstractThe author has previously claimed that neural activity in a medial frontal brain area represents conscious motor intentions. A. Machado and F. J. Silva (2007) attempted to challenge this claim by arguing that such intentions are not necessarily causally effective and must be caused by something else, so that they therefore cannot be the unmoved first movers in action. The author's reply is that he made no such claims about the causal status and origin of conscious intentions. In fact, he has elsewhere presented empirical evidence in support of the idea that intentions are not necessarily causal. But this does not stop researchers from studying the neural basis for the conscious impression that one intends and wills one's actions. One can feel and attend to such intentions, be they causal or not. The author's claim is that there is neural activity in the medial frontal wall that reflects such conscious feelings. Other recent empirical evidence that supports this view is described. © 2007 American Psychological Association.-
dc.languageeng-
dc.relation.ispartofAmerican Psychologist-
dc.subjectfree will-
dc.subjectvolition-
dc.subjectLibet-
dc.subjectintention-
dc.subjectconsciousness-
dc.titleShould Scientists Think?: Comment on Machado and Silva (2007)-
dc.typeArticle-
dc.description.naturelink_to_subscribed_fulltext-
dc.identifier.doi10.1037/0003-066X.62.7.686-
dc.identifier.pmid17924752-
dc.identifier.scopuseid_2-s2.0-35748945764-
dc.identifier.volume62-
dc.identifier.issue7-
dc.identifier.spage686-
dc.identifier.epage688-
dc.identifier.isiWOS:000250131700006-
dc.identifier.issnl0003-066X-

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