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- Publisher Website: 10.1561/100.00008039
- Scopus: eid_2-s2.0-67651061737
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Article: Political decentralization and policy experimentation
Title | Political decentralization and policy experimentation |
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Authors | |
Keywords | Decentralization Innovation Policy experiments Voting Information |
Issue Date | 2009 |
Citation | Quarterly Journal of Political Science, 2009, v. 4, n. 1, p. 35-58 How to Cite? |
Abstract | Since 1932, when Justice Louis Brandeis remarked that in a federal system states can serve as "laboratories" of democracy, political decentralization has been thought to stimulate policy experimentation. We reexamine the political economy behind this belief, using a simple model of voting in centralized and decentralized democracies. We find that the electoral logic suggests the opposite conclusion: centralization usually leads to "too much" policy experimentation, compared to the social optimum, while decentralization leads to "too little." Three effects of centralization - an "informational externality," a "risk-seeking" effect, and a "risk-conserving" effect - account for the different outcomes. © 2009 H. Cai and D. Treisman. |
Persistent Identifier | http://hdl.handle.net/10722/241893 |
ISSN | 2023 Impact Factor: 1.5 2023 SCImago Journal Rankings: 2.033 |
ISI Accession Number ID |
DC Field | Value | Language |
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dc.contributor.author | Cai, Hongbin | - |
dc.contributor.author | Treisman, Daniel | - |
dc.date.accessioned | 2017-06-23T01:56:02Z | - |
dc.date.available | 2017-06-23T01:56:02Z | - |
dc.date.issued | 2009 | - |
dc.identifier.citation | Quarterly Journal of Political Science, 2009, v. 4, n. 1, p. 35-58 | - |
dc.identifier.issn | 1554-0626 | - |
dc.identifier.uri | http://hdl.handle.net/10722/241893 | - |
dc.description.abstract | Since 1932, when Justice Louis Brandeis remarked that in a federal system states can serve as "laboratories" of democracy, political decentralization has been thought to stimulate policy experimentation. We reexamine the political economy behind this belief, using a simple model of voting in centralized and decentralized democracies. We find that the electoral logic suggests the opposite conclusion: centralization usually leads to "too much" policy experimentation, compared to the social optimum, while decentralization leads to "too little." Three effects of centralization - an "informational externality," a "risk-seeking" effect, and a "risk-conserving" effect - account for the different outcomes. © 2009 H. Cai and D. Treisman. | - |
dc.language | eng | - |
dc.relation.ispartof | Quarterly Journal of Political Science | - |
dc.subject | Decentralization | - |
dc.subject | Innovation | - |
dc.subject | Policy experiments | - |
dc.subject | Voting | - |
dc.subject | Information | - |
dc.title | Political decentralization and policy experimentation | - |
dc.type | Article | - |
dc.description.nature | link_to_subscribed_fulltext | - |
dc.identifier.doi | 10.1561/100.00008039 | - |
dc.identifier.scopus | eid_2-s2.0-67651061737 | - |
dc.identifier.volume | 4 | - |
dc.identifier.issue | 1 | - |
dc.identifier.spage | 35 | - |
dc.identifier.epage | 58 | - |
dc.identifier.eissn | 1554-0634 | - |
dc.identifier.isi | WOS:000270725000002 | - |
dc.identifier.issnl | 1554-0626 | - |