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- Publisher Website: 10.1006/jeth.2000.2658
- Scopus: eid_2-s2.0-0242590238
- WOS: WOS:000089106400006
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Article: Delay in Multilateral Bargaining under Complete Information
Title | Delay in Multilateral Bargaining under Complete Information |
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Authors | |
Keywords | Multilateral bargaining; complete information; delay; Coase theorem |
Issue Date | 2000 |
Citation | Journal of Economic Theory, 2000, v. 93, n. 2, p. 260-276 How to Cite? |
Abstract | This paper analyzes a complete-information, infinite-horizon, multilateral bargaining model in which one player bargains with each of the other players one at a time and binding cash-offer contracts are used to govern transactions. Under a weak stationarity condition on equilibrium strategies, we characterize the set of equilibria for the game. We show that when players are sufficiently patient, significant delay in reaching agreements may emerge and this delay can become longer quickly as the number of involved parties rises. Indeed, when the number of bargainers is large, perpetual disagreement can occur in equilibrium. Journal of Economic Literature Classification Numbers: C78, D23, D62. © 2000 Academic Press. |
Persistent Identifier | http://hdl.handle.net/10722/241885 |
ISSN | 2023 Impact Factor: 1.4 2023 SCImago Journal Rankings: 3.218 |
ISI Accession Number ID |
DC Field | Value | Language |
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dc.contributor.author | Cai, Hongbin | - |
dc.date.accessioned | 2017-06-23T01:56:00Z | - |
dc.date.available | 2017-06-23T01:56:00Z | - |
dc.date.issued | 2000 | - |
dc.identifier.citation | Journal of Economic Theory, 2000, v. 93, n. 2, p. 260-276 | - |
dc.identifier.issn | 0022-0531 | - |
dc.identifier.uri | http://hdl.handle.net/10722/241885 | - |
dc.description.abstract | This paper analyzes a complete-information, infinite-horizon, multilateral bargaining model in which one player bargains with each of the other players one at a time and binding cash-offer contracts are used to govern transactions. Under a weak stationarity condition on equilibrium strategies, we characterize the set of equilibria for the game. We show that when players are sufficiently patient, significant delay in reaching agreements may emerge and this delay can become longer quickly as the number of involved parties rises. Indeed, when the number of bargainers is large, perpetual disagreement can occur in equilibrium. Journal of Economic Literature Classification Numbers: C78, D23, D62. © 2000 Academic Press. | - |
dc.language | eng | - |
dc.relation.ispartof | Journal of Economic Theory | - |
dc.subject | Multilateral bargaining; complete information; delay; Coase theorem | - |
dc.title | Delay in Multilateral Bargaining under Complete Information | - |
dc.type | Article | - |
dc.description.nature | link_to_subscribed_fulltext | - |
dc.identifier.doi | 10.1006/jeth.2000.2658 | - |
dc.identifier.scopus | eid_2-s2.0-0242590238 | - |
dc.identifier.volume | 93 | - |
dc.identifier.issue | 2 | - |
dc.identifier.spage | 260 | - |
dc.identifier.epage | 276 | - |
dc.identifier.isi | WOS:000089106400006 | - |
dc.identifier.issnl | 0022-0531 | - |