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- Publisher Website: 10.5840/jphil201611311
- Scopus: eid_2-s2.0-84992348140
- WOS: WOS:000379885300001
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Article: Using Defaults to Understand Token Causation
Title | Using Defaults to Understand Token Causation |
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Authors | |
Issue Date | 2016 |
Citation | Journal of Philosophy, 2016, v. 113, p. 5-26 How to Cite? |
Abstract | Recent literature on causation invokes a distinction between deviant and default behavior to account for token causation. Critical examination of two prominent attempts to employ a distinction between deviants and defaults reveals that the distinction is far from clear. I clarify and develop the distinction by appeal to the notion of a modally robust process, and show how the distinction can be employed by causal process theorists to respond to cases of causation by omission. This shows that the default/deviant distinction is not so much a tool for counterfactual accounts of causation, but rather for causal process theory. |
Persistent Identifier | http://hdl.handle.net/10722/228781 |
ISI Accession Number ID |
DC Field | Value | Language |
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dc.contributor.author | Wolff, JE | - |
dc.date.accessioned | 2016-08-23T14:07:04Z | - |
dc.date.available | 2016-08-23T14:07:04Z | - |
dc.date.issued | 2016 | - |
dc.identifier.citation | Journal of Philosophy, 2016, v. 113, p. 5-26 | - |
dc.identifier.uri | http://hdl.handle.net/10722/228781 | - |
dc.description.abstract | Recent literature on causation invokes a distinction between deviant and default behavior to account for token causation. Critical examination of two prominent attempts to employ a distinction between deviants and defaults reveals that the distinction is far from clear. I clarify and develop the distinction by appeal to the notion of a modally robust process, and show how the distinction can be employed by causal process theorists to respond to cases of causation by omission. This shows that the default/deviant distinction is not so much a tool for counterfactual accounts of causation, but rather for causal process theory. | - |
dc.language | eng | - |
dc.relation.ispartof | Journal of Philosophy | - |
dc.title | Using Defaults to Understand Token Causation | - |
dc.type | Article | - |
dc.identifier.email | Wolff, JE: jwolff@hku.hk | - |
dc.identifier.authority | Wolff, JE=rp01643 | - |
dc.identifier.doi | 10.5840/jphil201611311 | - |
dc.identifier.scopus | eid_2-s2.0-84992348140 | - |
dc.identifier.hkuros | 261988 | - |
dc.identifier.volume | 113 | - |
dc.identifier.spage | 5 | - |
dc.identifier.epage | 26 | - |
dc.identifier.isi | WOS:000379885300001 | - |