How do peer firms affect a firm's earnings forecast desicion around the earnings announcement date?

Abstract

I investigate how peer firms affect a firm’s management earnings forecast decision around its earnings announcement date. I find that the probability of a firm issuing a good news forecast is positively related to the proportion of peer firms issuing good news forecasts, but a firm’s bad news forecast is not affected by the bad news forecasts of peer firms. Furthermore, I find that the positive influence of peers’ good news forecasts on the good news forecast of the following firm is weaker with the presence of the firm’s higher transient institutional ownership, and stronger when analyst followings of the firm are larger. In addition, I find that firms do not fabricate good news to follow good news forecasts of peer firms, only choosing to reveal good news. These findings suggest that managers herd on early good news forecasts to avoid their stock prices being discounted by investors, but not on early bad news forecasts because managers hope that subsequent favorable events may bury early bad news.