File Download
There are no files associated with this item.
Links for fulltext
(May Require Subscription)
- Publisher Website: 10.4324/9780203712498
- Scopus: eid_2-s2.0-85045119860
Supplementary
-
Citations:
- Scopus: 0
- Appears in Collections:
Book Chapter: Realism and Theories of Truth
| Title | Realism and Theories of Truth |
|---|---|
| Authors | |
| Issue Date | 2018 |
| Publisher | Routledge. |
| Citation | Realism and Theories of Truth. In Saatsi, J (Ed.), The Routledge Handbook of Scientific Realism. New York: Routledge, 2018 How to Cite? |
| Abstract | The topic of truth has long been thought to be connected to scientific realism and its opposition. In this chapter, I discuss the various ways that truth might be related to realism. First, I consider how truth might be of use when defining scientific realism and its opposition. Second, I consider whether various stances regarding realism require specific stances on the nature of truth. I survey 'ʼneutralist’' views that argue that one’s stance on realism is independent of one’s view on truth and partisan positions that claim that one’s attitude on realism is, in part, determined by one’s theory of truth. Though partisan views have been popular and defended by seminal figures such as Thomas Kuhn, Richard Rorty, Hilary Putnam, and Arthur Fine, I raise a number of objections for them. © 2018 selection and editorial matter, Juha Saatsi; individual chapters, the contributors. |
| Persistent Identifier | http://hdl.handle.net/10722/227782 |
| ISBN | |
| Series/Report no. | Routledge Handbooks in Philosophy Series |
| DC Field | Value | Language |
|---|---|---|
| dc.contributor.author | Asay, JF | - |
| dc.date.accessioned | 2016-07-18T09:12:47Z | - |
| dc.date.available | 2016-07-18T09:12:47Z | - |
| dc.date.issued | 2018 | - |
| dc.identifier.citation | Realism and Theories of Truth. In Saatsi, J (Ed.), The Routledge Handbook of Scientific Realism. New York: Routledge, 2018 | - |
| dc.identifier.isbn | 9781138888852 | - |
| dc.identifier.uri | http://hdl.handle.net/10722/227782 | - |
| dc.description.abstract | The topic of truth has long been thought to be connected to scientific realism and its opposition. In this chapter, I discuss the various ways that truth might be related to realism. First, I consider how truth might be of use when defining scientific realism and its opposition. Second, I consider whether various stances regarding realism require specific stances on the nature of truth. I survey 'ʼneutralist’' views that argue that one’s stance on realism is independent of one’s view on truth and partisan positions that claim that one’s attitude on realism is, in part, determined by one’s theory of truth. Though partisan views have been popular and defended by seminal figures such as Thomas Kuhn, Richard Rorty, Hilary Putnam, and Arthur Fine, I raise a number of objections for them. © 2018 selection and editorial matter, Juha Saatsi; individual chapters, the contributors. | - |
| dc.language | eng | - |
| dc.publisher | Routledge. | - |
| dc.relation.ispartof | The Routledge Handbook of Scientific Realism | - |
| dc.relation.ispartofseries | Routledge Handbooks in Philosophy Series | - |
| dc.title | Realism and Theories of Truth | - |
| dc.type | Book_Chapter | - |
| dc.identifier.email | Asay, JF: asay@hku.hk | - |
| dc.identifier.authority | Asay, JF=rp01955 | - |
| dc.description.nature | link_to_subscribed_fulltext | - |
| dc.identifier.doi | 10.4324/9780203712498 | - |
| dc.identifier.scopus | eid_2-s2.0-85045119860 | - |
| dc.identifier.hkuros | 259841 | - |
| dc.publisher.place | New York | - |