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Book Chapter: China's Striking Anti-Corruption Adventure: A Political Journey Towards the Rule of Law?
Title | China's Striking Anti-Corruption Adventure: A Political Journey Towards the Rule of Law? |
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Authors | |
Issue Date | 2016 |
Publisher | CUP |
Citation | China's Striking Anti-Corruption Adventure: A Political Journey Towards the Rule of Law? In Chen, W (Ed.), The Beijing Consensus? How China Has Changed the Western Ideas of Law and Economic Development: CUP, 2016 How to Cite? |
Abstract | China is a high-corruption country and the ruling Communist Party (“the Party”) has made anti-corruption enforcement a top priority. China is also well known for her authoritarian decisiveness in policy making and her effectiveness in policy implementation with a centralized political control contrasting sharply with a decentralized economic policy. This chapter examines two key aspects of this formulation. First, how has the authoritarian characteristic affected China’s anticorruption enforcement; and, second, how is China different from other countries, authoritarian or otherwise, in this regard?
This chapter discusses China’s anti-corruption enforcement within the context of the convergence/divergence debate and examines the degree to which the Chinese anti-corruption model converges or diverges from the prevailing “international best practice” that is commonly observed in the high income/low corruption countries. Specifically this chapter will also discuss whether China could develop an anti-corruption system that operates within a rule-based legal framework. The principal argument is that China’s anti-corruption practice manifests certain core features that may be unique to the Chinese political context and those features show most strikingly at the height of an anti-corruption campaign. But if we look beyond an exceptional “strike-hard campaign” that targets the “tigers”, shift the focus to the more routine enforcement against “flies”, and, in particular, observe China’s anti-corruption enforcement for a longer time span, it becomes clearer that China does not operate an anticorruption model sui generis. As the anti-corruption storm dies down (as it will naturally occur), the enforcement will become more routine, regularized, and institutional. When that happens, the Chinese anti-corruption model, if any, will appear no different from models elsewhere. |
Persistent Identifier | http://hdl.handle.net/10722/223185 |
SSRN |
DC Field | Value | Language |
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dc.contributor.author | Fu, H | - |
dc.date.accessioned | 2016-02-23T01:49:20Z | - |
dc.date.available | 2016-02-23T01:49:20Z | - |
dc.date.issued | 2016 | - |
dc.identifier.citation | China's Striking Anti-Corruption Adventure: A Political Journey Towards the Rule of Law? In Chen, W (Ed.), The Beijing Consensus? How China Has Changed the Western Ideas of Law and Economic Development: CUP, 2016 | - |
dc.identifier.uri | http://hdl.handle.net/10722/223185 | - |
dc.description.abstract | China is a high-corruption country and the ruling Communist Party (“the Party”) has made anti-corruption enforcement a top priority. China is also well known for her authoritarian decisiveness in policy making and her effectiveness in policy implementation with a centralized political control contrasting sharply with a decentralized economic policy. This chapter examines two key aspects of this formulation. First, how has the authoritarian characteristic affected China’s anticorruption enforcement; and, second, how is China different from other countries, authoritarian or otherwise, in this regard? This chapter discusses China’s anti-corruption enforcement within the context of the convergence/divergence debate and examines the degree to which the Chinese anti-corruption model converges or diverges from the prevailing “international best practice” that is commonly observed in the high income/low corruption countries. Specifically this chapter will also discuss whether China could develop an anti-corruption system that operates within a rule-based legal framework. The principal argument is that China’s anti-corruption practice manifests certain core features that may be unique to the Chinese political context and those features show most strikingly at the height of an anti-corruption campaign. But if we look beyond an exceptional “strike-hard campaign” that targets the “tigers”, shift the focus to the more routine enforcement against “flies”, and, in particular, observe China’s anti-corruption enforcement for a longer time span, it becomes clearer that China does not operate an anticorruption model sui generis. As the anti-corruption storm dies down (as it will naturally occur), the enforcement will become more routine, regularized, and institutional. When that happens, the Chinese anti-corruption model, if any, will appear no different from models elsewhere. | - |
dc.language | eng | - |
dc.publisher | CUP | - |
dc.relation.ispartof | The Beijing Consensus? How China Has Changed the Western Ideas of Law and Economic Development | - |
dc.title | China's Striking Anti-Corruption Adventure: A Political Journey Towards the Rule of Law? | - |
dc.type | Book_Chapter | - |
dc.identifier.email | Fu, H: hlfu@hku.hk | - |
dc.identifier.authority | Fu, H=rp01245 | - |
dc.description.nature | postprint | - |
dc.identifier.doi | 10.1017/9781316481370.011 | - |
dc.identifier.ssrn | 2723348 | - |
dc.identifier.hkulrp | 2016/001 | - |