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- Publisher Website: 10.1628/093245614X14001382825066
- Scopus: eid_2-s2.0-84928182814
- WOS: WOS:000346950700007
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Article: Task Interdependence And Non-contractibility In Public Good Provision
Title | Task Interdependence And Non-contractibility In Public Good Provision |
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Authors | |
Issue Date | 2014 |
Publisher | Mohr Siebeck. The Journal's web site is located at http://www.mohr.de/jite.html |
Citation | Journal Of Institutional And Theoretical Economics, 2014, v. 170 n. 4, p. 731-748 How to Cite? |
Abstract | In the context of public good provision, despite non-contractibility of investments, it is possible to specify who is in charge of tasks such as construction and maintenance. We show that complementarity between the investments of the two tasks favours unbundling of tasks through different contracts against bundling of them into a single contract, whether the built facility is privately or publicly owned. We also obtain general conditions that determine the efficiency of traditional procurement vis-a-vis public-private partnership (PPP). |
Persistent Identifier | http://hdl.handle.net/10722/214697 |
ISSN | 2023 Impact Factor: 0.2 2023 SCImago Journal Rankings: 0.229 |
ISI Accession Number ID |
DC Field | Value | Language |
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dc.contributor.author | Chiu, SYW | - |
dc.contributor.author | Chen, BR | - |
dc.date.accessioned | 2015-08-21T11:51:57Z | - |
dc.date.available | 2015-08-21T11:51:57Z | - |
dc.date.issued | 2014 | - |
dc.identifier.citation | Journal Of Institutional And Theoretical Economics, 2014, v. 170 n. 4, p. 731-748 | - |
dc.identifier.issn | 0932-4569 | - |
dc.identifier.uri | http://hdl.handle.net/10722/214697 | - |
dc.description.abstract | In the context of public good provision, despite non-contractibility of investments, it is possible to specify who is in charge of tasks such as construction and maintenance. We show that complementarity between the investments of the two tasks favours unbundling of tasks through different contracts against bundling of them into a single contract, whether the built facility is privately or publicly owned. We also obtain general conditions that determine the efficiency of traditional procurement vis-a-vis public-private partnership (PPP). | - |
dc.language | eng | - |
dc.publisher | Mohr Siebeck. The Journal's web site is located at http://www.mohr.de/jite.html | - |
dc.relation.ispartof | Journal Of Institutional And Theoretical Economics | - |
dc.title | Task Interdependence And Non-contractibility In Public Good Provision | - |
dc.type | Article | - |
dc.identifier.email | Chiu, SYW: sywchiu@hku.hk | - |
dc.identifier.authority | Chiu, SYW=rp01057 | - |
dc.identifier.doi | 10.1628/093245614X14001382825066 | - |
dc.identifier.scopus | eid_2-s2.0-84928182814 | - |
dc.identifier.hkuros | 249529 | - |
dc.identifier.volume | 170 | - |
dc.identifier.issue | 4 | - |
dc.identifier.spage | 731 | - |
dc.identifier.epage | 748 | - |
dc.identifier.isi | WOS:000346950700007 | - |
dc.publisher.place | Tübingen, Germany | - |
dc.identifier.issnl | 0932-4569 | - |