Relevant Lies

Abstract

This article has three main objectives. The first is to promote an overt, objectively rigorous and principled approach to both the discipline and the potential of rational relevance as the cornerstone of admissibility, use and weight of evidence decisions in common law criminal trials. The second is to demonstrate the inadequacy in principle and practice of the traditional common law admissibility proxy for probative value of a division between relevance to issue and relevance to credit. Both objectives are approached through an in-depth examination of the irrational disparities in treatment of decisions to lie by prosecution/law enforcement personnel (officers), sexual offence complainants and defendants that adherence to the issue/ credit distinction has at least facilitated throughout the common law world. The third objective is to propose and illustrate the probable implications of an overt, objective and principled approach to relevance with the alternative starting point of a division between decisions to utter current offence lies and non-current offence lies.